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other actors reason with such precedents? This article shows how a particular approach to 
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used for a critical analysis of the European Court of Justice’s case law. It is suggested that while 
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satisfactory), the EU system is still waiting for an account of the Court’s lawmaking and 
precedent. The conclusion indicates directions of possible further research relevant for all 
courts examined. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The status of the European Court of Justice’s decisions in EU law is somewhat 
puzzling. Article 288 TFEU indicates that decisions are binding only on those to 
whom they are addressed. However, this underplays their significance. When 
applying the text of the Treaty itself, such as Article 30 TFEU prohibiting 
quantitative restrictions on imports between the Member States, lawyers always 
need to consult decisions of the Court in order to know whether the prohibition 
applies in their case. In the absence of the Court’s decisions much of EU law 
would not exist: foundational doctrines of EU law, such as direct effect and 
primacy, can be found only there.1 The puzzle is well illustrated by a major treatise 
on the EU judicial system which states that the ‘case law – though in theory not 
formally binding – is often the most important source of law’.  
On the other hand, it is ‘no longer especially controversial to insist that 
common law judges make law’,2 and a doctrine of precedent is a paradigmatic 
feature of the US legal system, which belongs to the common law tradition. The 
Cour de cassation, however, cannot make law – properly so called – and its 
jurisprudence is a mere authority, although nobody denies its practical importance. 
And since the Cour does not make law, its decisions can be extremely brief, 
lacking any ‘case law technique’ familiar from common law.  
In this article I look at judicial lawmaking and precedent in the context of the 
US Supreme Court’s constitutional adjudication and the French Cour de 
cassation’s application of the Civil Code and examine whether the foregoing 
characterisations of the US and the French legal system are entirely true. I then use 
these findings in order better to understand the European Court of Justice’s case 
law.  
The first section of this article provides a working definition of precedent and 
briefly discusses the persistent debate on the dichotomy (or convergence) between 
common and civil law. I stress that depending on the particular features of 
precedent on which one focuses, one may or may not be able to conclude that 
these legal traditions are converging as regards their treatment of previous judicial 
decisions. I then discuss the questions that I see to be important in connection to 
my inquiry into judicial lawmaking and precedent in EU law. The questions are, 
firstly, in what sense is it said that these courts make law; second, who is 
constrained by their pronouncements; and, thirdly, how does the precedential 
constraint actually work in each of the systems. 
The two sections that follow examine these questions in the context of two 
legal systems: the US and the French. I examine the role of the Supreme Court’s 
precedents in constitutional adjudication and the Cour de cassation’s jurisprudence 
interpreting the Civil Code. While many legal thinkers acknowledge that judges 
                                                     
1 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 and Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.  
2 F. Schauer, ‘Do Cases Make Bad Law?’ (2006) 73 University of Chicago Law Review 883, 886.  
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make law in both systems, they also insist that this judicial lawmaking is based on 
creative interpretation of the foundational documents – the Constitution and the 
Civil Code. Both courts are often said to declare what these documents mean; they 
are not acknowledged as having autonomous power to create norms independent of 
the foundational document. In the US this understanding of the judicial 
lawmaking activity (in the context of constitutional adjudication) allows other 
branches of government to claim that they can provide competing interpretations 
of the Constitution. In France the fiction of ‘lawmaking as creative interpretation’ 
allows the legislator to control the Cour by adopting legislative provisions which 
correct interpretations adopted by the Cour.  
I also argue that a particular conception of a case before the two courts is 
important for understanding the nature of precedential constraint, firstly since it 
limits the precedent court’s lawmaking power, and secondly because it brings 
elements of ‘real life’ into lawmaking through adjudication (in contrast to 
lawmaking by legislatures). The two systems have distinct mechanisms to achieve 
this.  
The concluding section applies these findings to the functioning of the 
European Court of Justice’s case law. I suggest that while in some respects the 
functioning resembles the two systems, it does not contain (or does not employ in 
practice) the elements which would allow other actors – lower courts and political 
branches – to constrain the Court or moderate its lawmaking activity. The Court 
enjoys expositional supremacy and exclusivity, with regard to both political 
institutions in the EU and other courts.  
Nor does the case play the central role in the reasoning with the Court’s 
precedent. In its decisions the Court says too much when compared with the 
French Cour de cassation, which must respond strictly to the legal grounds of an 
appeal in cassation, and too little when compared with the US Supreme Court, 
which must persuade other courts to follow its precedents in the way it wants 
them to. However, the European Court of Justice cannot command other courts 
in the same way as the Cour de cassation, since it does not have an effective 
sanction to enforce their obedience.  
The conclusion indicates directions for further research on judicial lawmaking 
and precedent, addressing problems identified in this article.  
 
 
 
APPROACHING PRECEDENT 
 
I propose a broad definition of precedent: a prior judicial decision which has 
normative implications beyond the context of the particular case in which it was 
delivered. I use the notion of precedent as a generic term which, for the purposes 
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of this article, covers both the common law doctrine of stare decisis (or precedent)3 
and the French concept of jurisprudence.4  
That something has normative implications does not imply strict formal 
binding force which would require the court to choose between recognising a 
relevant prior judicial decision as binding and following it, or overruling it (or 
possibly to break the law if the court is not entitled to overrule prior judicial 
decisions it does not want to follow).5 This is how ‘legally binding’ is sometimes 
understood, and I am interested in the wider effects precedent has. Another 
reason I use the term ‘normative implications’ instead of the more common terms 
used in relation to precedent (for example ‘strictly binding,’ contrasted with 
‘persuasive’)6 is the very peculiar nature of precedential constraint, which resists 
such binary classifications. It is one of this article’s aims to explore the nature of 
precedential constraint in each of the systems. The difficulties of such an 
enterprise can be illustrated by the controversy surrounding the debate on the 
convergence between the civil and common law legal traditions as regards their 
treatment of precedent.  
Interpreting Precedents,7 the product of a group of leading legal theorists 
thoroughly examining a number of legal systems on the basis of a set of agreed 
questions, claims ‘that precedent counts for a great deal in civilian countries’ and 
even asserts that ‘[t]he tendency to convergence between systems of two types is a 
salient fact of the later twentieth century, although there remain real differences, 
some of great importance’.8 Adams, on the other hand, notes in his critical review 
of Interpreting Precedent that ‘despite academic arguments to the contrary, Belgian 
courts mostly cite precedents or case-law, if at all, in an opportunistic manner – 
[ie], when they confirm the position taken by a court’.9 Therefore ‘to conclude that 
                                                     
3 F. Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer. A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Cambridge, Mass. and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), 37 reserves the term ‘stare decisis’ only for horizontal precedent 
(concerning the same court) and distinguishes it from precedent. The term ‘vertical stare decisis’ is 
nevertheless also used, and I do not make this distinction in this article. I use stare decisis and precedent 
synonymously.  
4 I italicise the term ‘jurisprudence’ to make clear its distinctiveness from the common law understanding of 
precedent and also, to distinguish it from the English use of the term. For different understandings of the 
word ‘jurisprudence’, which has its origin in the Latin word iurisprudentia, see C. Grzegorczyk, 
‘Jurisprudence: phénomène judiciaire, science ou méthode?’ (1985) 30 Archives de philosophie du droit 35.  
5 See A. Peczenik, ‘The Binding Force of Precedent’ in N. MacCormick and R.S. Summers (eds), 
Interpreting Precedents. A Comparative Study (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1997), 478, who notes that ‘formal 
bindingness may be regarded as a non-graded concept, like “pregnant”’ and then explains that it is too 
narrow a view.  
6 See eg the classic, R. Cross and J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 4th ed, 
1991), 4.  
7 note 5 above.  
8 N. MacCormick and R.S. Summers, ‘Introduction’ in MacCormick and Summers (eds), n 5 above, 2. See 
also ibid, ‘Further General Reflections and Conclusions’ in MacCormick and Summers (eds), n 5 above, 
546-547.  
9 See M. Adams, ‘The Rhetoric of Precedent and Comparative Legal Research’ (1999) 62 Modern Law 
Review 464, 465-466.  
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the civil and common law are significantly converging is [according to Adams] 
surely an exaggeration’.10  
Another comparatist, Mauro Cappelletti, also takes a rather cautious 
approach: ‘[s]tare decisis is still an important difference, even though, admittedly, a 
diminishing one’.11 Cappelletti highlights three ‘still important differences’: a) the 
organization of higher courts (into different hierarchies, which leads to ‘more 
diffuse authority of both the organs themselves and their decisions’), b) their lack 
of discretion to select cases that they want to hear (which, apart from a huge 
workload, has an impact on judges’ understanding  of their task in the legal system 
– which is not to create precedents but rather to control the application of the law 
by lower courts in thousands of cases), and finally c) the kind of people who sit on 
the bench in the highest courts.12 He illustrates his thesis with the example of 
judicial review in the civil law tradition, which is centralised in the hands of one 
court, and argues that the absence of precedent was one of the reasons for its 
centralisation.13  
The question of the difference between the two traditions’ approaches to 
precedent is far from theoretical: as I mentioned, the European Union brings the 
two traditions together, and we can expect each to treat the Court’s decisions 
somewhat differently. It can seem that Adams was justified in criticizing Interpreting 
Precedents as regards the ‘convergence thesis’.14 But I think much depends on what 
one sees to be important about precedent. In the following section I try to discuss 
at least some of the features of precedent which seem to be important in relation 
to the working of the EU judicial system. The US Supreme Court’s doctrine of 
stare decisis in the context of constitutional adjudication and the concept of 
jurisprudence as employed by the French Cour de cassation or, more precisely, the 
French civil law scholarship, will assist me in this inquiry.  
I want to emphasise at the outset that I am aware of the challenge of any such 
wide comparative exercise: there is no single understanding of the concept of stare 
decisis or jurisprudence within the legal systems which I am going to study. So in the 
course of my inquiry I make conscious choices, based on the purpose of this 
article: among the various plausible understandings and theories I focus on those 
which can say something relevant about the practice of the Court of Justice (while 
of course, I am trying to do justice – or rather to avoid doing injustice – to their 
                                                     
10 ibid, 465. See also M. Adams, ‘Precedent Versus Gravitational Force of Court Decisions in Belgium: 
Between Theory, Law and Facts’ in E. Hondius (ed), Precedent and the Law (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007), 151. 
11 ‘The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Civil Law: A Fundamental Difference – or no Difference at 
All?’ in H. Bernstein, U. Drobnig, and H. Kötz (eds), Festschrift für Konrad Zweigert zum 70. Geburstag 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1981), 392.  
12 ibid, 383-388. 
13 ibid, 389-392. Cappelletti gives an example of Italy, where a diffuse (decentralised) model was adopted 
for a short period (1948-1956) and did not work.  
14 On the other hand, Peczenik’s contribution to the volume (n 5 above) makes an elaborate[d] effort to 
distinguish between various types of ‘bindingness,’ reflecting the treatment of precedent in different legal 
systems, and N. MacCormick and R.S. Summers, ‘Further General Reflections and Conclusions’ in 
MacCormick and Summers (eds), n 5 above, 531, 536-542 carefully analyse ‘significant remaining 
differences’.  
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alternatives). My attempt is to take what William Ewald called the ‘jurisprudential 
approach to comparative law’15 – to dig deeper into the minds of lawyers, and 
particularly legal thinkers, in the two selected legal systems to see how they 
understand their practice and its place within their legal systems. As will become 
apparent particularly in relation to my analysis of the concept of the jurisprudence of 
the Cour de cassation, much of its widespread understanding (especially in 
Anglophone writings) is based on a failure to approach it with the French 
conceptual framework in mind.  
What are the features of precedent which I propose to examine?  
The first question can be labelled the ‘hermeneutics of precedent’. It seeks to 
understand what the normative basis for precedent’s effects beyond a particular 
case is. It is related to the (once popular) question whether the court ‘makes’ or 
‘creates’ law or merely ‘finds’ or ‘declares’ it. An intuitive – and too fast a – 
response to this question would be that of course the US judges (like all common 
law judges) create law, and their French counterparts vigorously deny this. 
However, we will see that the response to this question is not so straightforward 
and is linked to the (ever popular and I am afraid never to be answered) question 
of what law is. Happily, and in line with the comparative jurisprudential approach, 
I do not examine this question in the abstract as a legal philosopher, which I am 
not. I want only to understand how the participants in the two legal systems being 
examined, the US and the French, tend to respond to it, in order to throw light on 
my inquiry.  
The second question asks who is constrained (in the widest sense of the 
word) by precedent. I examine it on three different levels: vertical, which refers to 
the courts inferior to the two examined courts; horizontal, that is the precedent 
court itself; and, finally, I look at the relationship between the two courts’ 
precedents and other branches of government. 
Finally, I ask about the nature of the effects which precedent produces. How 
does precedent constrain? To make it more concrete: precedential reasoning in 
common law is distinguished from reasoning on the basis of legislation since the 
constrained court (the one which is to apply the precedent rule) has comparatively 
greater freedom in moderating the rule on the basis of the facts which underlie the 
precedent decision. I examine two more specific and interrelated problems: firstly, 
what role the factual context of the case – a ‘real life’ situation – plays in reasoning 
from precedent, and, secondly, how is the case – as opposed to the abstract 
context in which the legislator makes law – relevant for the extraction of the norm 
implied in the precedent decision.  
Necessarily, these questions do not exhaust all problems of judicial 
lawmaking and precedent in each of the systems. I do not explore here how 
judicial decisions are reported and what consequences publication practices have 
                                                     
15 See W. Ewald, ‘The Jurisprudential Approach to Comparative Law: A Field Guide to “Rats”’ (1998) 46 
American Journal of Comparative Law 701.  
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for the normative implications of precedent. I also leave unexamined the role of 
other actors, particularly academics, who in France – in the form of la doctrine – 
play a more important role in the functioning of jurisprudence than their 
counterparts in the US. However, the often emphasised differences between the 
common law and civil law traditions do not seem so sharp when we move from 
large scale studies of the two traditions to particular legal systems. As with the 
inquiry into precedent in the two traditions the extent of the difference depends 
on what questions one has in mind.16  
 
 
 
THE US SUPREME COURT: STARE DECISIS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
 
THE SUPREME COURT ONLY SAYS WHAT THE CONSTITUTION IS; IT DOES NOT MAKE 
IT  
 
There is a fundamental difference between common law adjudication and 
constitutional adjudication. The view that it is ‘no longer especially controversial to 
insist that common law judges make law’17 concerns just common law and not the 
interpretation of the Constitution. In constitutional adjudication, all creative power 
of the Court is justified by its task of interpreting and applying the Constitution. 
At the dawn of US constitutionalism Chief Justice Marshall expressed the view 
that ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity 
expound and interpret that rule’.18 Many (surely not all) theories of constitutional 
interpretation are based on this premise: the Court does not make the 
Constitution, but merely gives meaning to it, no matter how creative this process 
                                                     
16 P. Jestaz and C. Jamin, ‘The Entity of French Doctrine: Some Thoughts on the Community of French 
Legal Writers’ (1998) 18 Legal Studies 415, 427, for example, contend that ‘the countries using common law 
do not feel the need for rational constructions and only show mistrust of the creators of systems like [the 
French]. Thus, their best jurists stopped writing treatises at least thirty years ago’. The same authors 
present the US academic scholarship as an ‘anti-model’ to the French doctrine in La doctrine. (Paris: Dalloz, 
2004), 265-306. But one may ask, for example, whether the Restatements are not ‘rational constructions’ of 
common law doctrines, or what one is to make of this statement by James Gordley: ‘Before the 19th 
century, the common law was not organized by doctrines or even by areas of law such as contract and 
tort. It was organized according to forms of action, each with its own rules. In the 19th and 20th 
centuries, treatise writers rationalized and systematized these rules.’ ‘The Common Law in the Twentieth 
Century: Some Unfinished Business’ (2000) 88 California Law Review 1815, 1817, or wonder what 
Laurence Tribe was writing about only few years ago in his ‘The Treatise Power’ (2005) 8 Green Bag 2d 
291. I do not want to undermine the differences which do exist; however, I think that such generalised 
statements are not very helpful if not directed to particular problems which one seeks to understand and 
possibly compare in different legal systems – be it precedent or academic doctrine.  
17 Schauer, n 2 above, 886.  
18 Marbury v Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 177 (1803).  
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is.19 Rubenfeld’s defence of the Court’s ‘judicial revolutions’, which he qualifies as 
‘radical reinterpretations’ of the Constitution, illustrates this.20  
The controversy concerns the question of what constitutes an interpretation 
mandated by the Constitution and how far this interpretation is, or ought to be, 
limited by the text of the Constitution or other norms and doctrines.21 It is clear 
that the Court’s interpretation determines the real obligations which flow from the 
Constitution and that in some sense the Supreme Court ‘makes’ constitutional law 
(sometimes the expression ‘constitutional common law’ is used). But it remains an 
interpretation, distinct from the Constitution itself.22  
 
WHO IS CONSTRAINED?  
 
Within the judicial branch, we must distinguish between vertical precedent, 
concerning courts on lower levels of the judicial hierarchy, and horizontal 
precedent, concerning courts at the same level of the judicial hierarchy. 
There are two separate judicial hierarchies below the Supreme Court: federal 
courts,23 and state courts. Both the federal courts and the state courts are subject 
to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In practice, however, this 
control is very limited, if only because of the limited number of cases the Court 
hears.24 At present the Supreme Court grants review in little more than one per 
cent of all petitions; of these granted petitions, even fewer come from state 
courts.25 Thus the federal and state courts, particularly the latter, retain a high 
                                                     
19 It is possible to find a few authors who do not deny that the Court has full-blown constitution-making 
power outside (or alongside) the written constitution. See eg R.H. Fallon, Implementing the Constitution 
(Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press 2001), 111-126. But Fallon also defends this by 
saying: ‘I know of no case in which the unwritten constitution calls for results that cannot at least be 
reconciled with the language of the written Constitution, even if reconciliation sometimes depends on 
tenuous or even specialized interpretations’. ibid, 111-112.  
20 See J. Rubenfeld, Revolution by Judiciary: The Structure of American Constitutional Law (Cambridge, Mass. and 
London: Harvard University Press, 2005).  
21 It is difficult to provide a ‘neutral’ reference to some general treatment of constitutional interpretation 
in the US, since it is perhaps the most contested topic in constitutional scholarship. But see R. Post, 
‘Theories of Constitutional Interpretation’ (1990) 30 Representations 13.  
22 As I said before, this is by no means an uncontested position. But note how eg D.A. Strauss, ‘Common 
Law Constitutional Interpretation’ (1996) 63 University of Chicago Law Review 877, 878, introduces his 
defence of a common law approach to constitutional interpretation: ‘the terms of debate in American 
constitutional law continue to be set by the view that principles of constitutional law must ultimately be 
traced to the text of the Constitution, and by the allied view that when the text is unclear the original 
understandings must control. An air of illegitimacy surrounds any alleged departure from the text or the 
original understandings’. 
23 For the purposes of this article, I do not distinguish between the so-called ‘Article III federal courts’ 
(created by the Congress directly on the basis of Article III, § 1 of the US Constitution), and ‘Article I (or 
also legislative) tribunals’ (which have their basis in legislation adopted by the Congress in accordance 
with Article I and not the Constitution itself). See J.E. Pfander, ‘Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, 
and the Judicial Power of the United States’ (2004) 118 Harvard Law Review 643.  
24 B. Friedman, ‘Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State 
Courts’ (2004) 104 Columbia Law Review 1211, 1216-1221 with further references particularly in fn 22.  
25 For the years 1998 to 2002 it was approximately 17 per cent of cases. See J.E. Pfander, ‘Köbler v Austria: 
Expositional Supremacy and Member State Liability’ (2006) 27 European Business Law Review 275, 297.  
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degree of autonomy, similar to that of the courts of EU Member States, which 
escape direct control by the Court of Justice.26 Despite the Supreme Court’s 
limited control, ‘the doctrine of hierarchical precedent appears deeply ingrained in 
judicial discourse – so much so that it constitutes a virtually undiscussed axiom of 
adjudication’.27  
The role direct appellate review plays in the doctrine of precedent is well 
illustrated by the attitude of state courts to decisions of lower federal courts. Since 
there is no direct control by federal courts,28 and appeal is possible only from state 
supreme courts to the Supreme Court, many state courts maintain that they are 
not bound by prior decisions of lower federal courts.29 Therefore only the 
Supreme Court is considered to have unquestionable authority by virtue of its 
being the ultimate authority as regards federal law and the Constitution.30 
Horizontal precedent at the Supreme Court31 became particularly 
controversial when the Court refused to overrule Roe v. Wade,32 relying on the 
special status of precedent in the US Constitution.33 The Supreme Court expressly 
considered the criteria for overruling, which are ‘customarily informed by a series 
of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of 
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the 
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case’.34 The criteria were:  
 
[…] whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical 
workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a 
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the 
cost of repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as 
to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or 
whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have 
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.35 
                                                     
26 I stress direct control, since there are possibilities of enforcing Member States’ courts’ compliance 
(through Member States’ liability and also infringement actions), although they are very limited. See the 
text to note 193 below.  
27 E.H. Caminker, ‘Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?’ (1994) 46 Stanford Law 
Review 817, 820 (who shows at length that ‘while the doctrine of hierarchical precedent is ultimately 
defensible, it is not as obviously defensible as the doctrine’s strength would suggest’ – quotation from the 
abstract).  
28 I leave aside here an important issue of habeas corpus review, a special form of ‘a postconviction 
remedy for prisoners claiming that error of federal law – almost always of federal constitutional law – 
infected the judicial proceedings [before state courts] that resulted in their detention’. See R.H. Fallon, Jr, 
et al, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System (New York: Foundation Press, 5th ed, 
2003), 1285.  
29 See eg W.W. Schwarzer, N.E. Weiss, and A. Hirsch, ‘Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of 
Litigation in State and Federal Courts’ (1992) 78 Virginia Law Review 1689, 1746-1747.  
30 See generally Caminker, n 27 above. 
31 I leave the question of mutual relationships between lower federal courts or state courts unexplored in 
this article.  
32 410 U.S. 113 (1973), an iconic precedent granting the constitutional right to abortion.  
33 Casey v Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
34 ibid, 854-855, internal references omitted.  
35 ibid.  
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Casey provoked a lively debate. Most reactions focused on the question of whether 
horizontal stare decisis was required by the US Constitution.36 More radical critiques 
of Casey considered horizontal stare decisis to be against the Constitution.37 
Common to both critiques was a concept of the Court’s role as interpreting the 
Constitution rather than creating it. Two separate authorities are embedded in 
precedent: the Constitution and the Court’s interpretation of it. 
While the Supreme Court insists that ‘the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution’38 – popularly taken to mean ‘the 
Constitution is what the judges say it is’39 – much contemporary US scholarship 
(and occasionally the other branches of government too) denies this.40 For 
example, when the President vetoes an act of Congress because he believes the act 
to be unconstitutional and declares such view, his understanding of the 
Constitution is unrestrained by the Court’s precedent.41 There is no remedy, and 
the presidential interpretation remains as a ‘true’ meaning of the Constitution.42 
Other branches of government may deny that they are bound by the Court’s 
interpretations of the Constitution, since they are just that – interpretations – not 
to be confused with the Constitution itself. This understanding of constitutional 
lawmaking by the Supreme Court as a mere interpretation of the Constitution 
allows other actors to emancipate themselves from the Court’s determinations of 
what the Constitution is and to develop their own interpretations. As Devins and 
Fisher put it:  
 
[…] the authority to say what the law is does not make the Court supreme, 
other than in that particular case. It is also the province and duty of Congress, 
in concert with the President, to say what the law is. The Court merely states 
                                                     
36 See particularly M.S. Paulsen, ‘Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the 
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?’ (2000) 109 Yale Law Journal 1535 (against horizontal stare decisis as 
a constitutional requirement) and R.H. Fallon, ‘Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on 
Constitutional Methodology’ (2001) 76 New York University Law Review 570 (responding to Paulsen and 
arguing the opposite).  
37 G. Lawson, ‘The Constitutional Case Against Precedent’ (1994) 17 Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy 23.  
38 Cooper v Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).  
39 Governor of New York (and later Chief Justice) Charles Evans Hughes, Speech before the Elmira 
Chamber of Commerce (3 May 1907), quoted in Schauer, n 3 above, 143, fn 38.  
40 The debate is framed in terms of ‘judicial supremacy’. For an introduction see L. Alexander and F. 
Schauer, ‘Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply’ (2000) 17 Constitutional Commentary 455 with further 
references.  
41 The example of the presidential veto refers to President Jackson, who in 1832, according to B. 
Friedman, ‘[i]n the message vetoing the extension of the Bank of the United States’ franchise, [...] 
specifically reserved the authority of the Executive to interpret the Constitution in a manner contrary to 
the judiciary’, in reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in McCulloch v Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819). See B. Friedman, ‘The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to 
Judicial Supremacy’ (1998) 73 New York University Law Review 333, 401-402.  
42 See eg L. Kramer, ‘The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court’ (2001) 115 Harvard Law 
Review 4, 5.  
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what the law is on the day the decision comes down. If Congress and the 
President disagree with that interpretation, the law may change after that.43 
 
In other words, according to this reading of the US Constitution other branches of 
government are not bound by the Supreme Court’s precedents.  
 
THE NATURE OF THE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT’S CONSTRAINT: CENTRALITY 
OF THE CASE  
 
The importance of the case for precedent  
Context of the case distinguishes reasoning from precedent from that based on 
rules enacted in an abstract context of the legislative procedure.44 As Neil 
Duxbury puts it:  
 
Since the recorded case [ie the precedent case] is not a strict verbal 
formulation of a principle, only exceptionally will judges conceive their task 
to be one of interpreting specific words or phrases within a case rather as they 
might focus on the precise wording of a statute. Instead, they will consider if 
the case is factually similar to or different from the case to be decided. Case-
law, we might say, unlike statute law, tends to be analogized rather than 
interpreted.45 
 
In the classical common law adjudication – which lies in the background of most 
theoretical studies of precedent – cases are analogised through their facts. It is on 
the basis of the facts of the precedent case that subsequent courts identify binding 
elements of the precedent decision – its ratio (‘holdings’ in the American 
parlance), or distinguish the precedent case from the one before them in order to 
explain that they are not bound by the precedent rule.46 This characteristic of 
precedent led Raz to observe that ‘judge-made law’ (as he calls it) is revisable, 
constantly open to the possibility of being distinguished.47 As we will see below, 
the constitutional interpretation of the Supreme Court differs from this traditional 
(common law) understanding of precedent, particularly because facts play a less 
significant role. But the case – defined otherwise than through its underlying facts 
– remains important for precedential reasoning.  
Two principal reasons are offered to explain why the context of the case 
matters in determining the extent to which a prior [previous] decision constrains a 
                                                     
43 N. Devins and L. Fisher, The Democratic Constitution (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 15.  
44 On the distinction between the two modes of lawmaking see J.J. Rachlinski, ‘Bottom-Up versus Top-
Down Lawmaking’ (2006) 73 University of Chicago Law Review 933.  
45 N. Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 59, 
emphasis added, references omitted.  
46 Among numerous accounts on precedential reasoning see Schauer, n 3 above, 44-60 and 180-184 and 
Duxbury, ibid, 58-110.  
47 J. Raz, The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 195.  
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later one. One stresses the importance of a ‘real-life situation’ for creating an 
optimal rule implicated in the precedent decision; the other concerns limitations 
on the lawmaking power of judges.  
 
The real-life context of judicial lawmaking  
Many people believe that the case gives a judge a special insight not available to 
the legislator. ‘Treating the resolution of concrete disputes as the preferred context 
in which to make law […] is the hallmark of the common law approach,’ says 
Schauer.48 This view is prevalent in much of the Supreme Court’s case law and is 
not limited to questions of precedent. The Court for example stated that ‘a 
concrete factual context [is] conducive to a realistic appreciation of the 
consequences of judicial action’.49 The emphasis on some ‘real-life’ disputes, in 
contrast to the abstract context in which legislators take their decisions, is perhaps 
best illustrated by Justice Holmes’ famous statement that ‘[t]he life of the law has 
not been logic: it has been experience’.50 Lawmaking in the context of deciding 
concrete disputes keeps the development of law in contact with reality.51  
However, Schauer has recently questioned this fundamental premise of 
common law adjudication by reference to another of Holmes’ dicta: ‘[g]reat cases 
like hard cases make bad law’,52 and pointed to the many distortive effects of a 
concrete situation in front of a court which faces it.53 The answer to Schauer’s 
concerns can be the adaptability of the common law, which can be greater than he 
himself admits,54 and also the fact that judicial lawmaking is not exclusive, but 
operates in mutual communication with the legislator.55  
 
The constraining function of the case  
Another reason why a case should be relevant for determining holdings is a desire 
to constrain judicial lawmaking activity. If creating law is seen as only a corollary 
to the courts’ main task of deciding disputes, then law creation will occur only in 
this context. One can therefore insist that only what has been said in this context 
(deciding the concrete dispute) matters. However, this view relies on an 
assumption that it is the primary role of the Supreme Court to decide disputes. Is 
the assumption correct?  
                                                     
48 See Schauer, n 2 above, 883 with further references.  
49 Valley Forge Christian Coll v Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982), 
quoted by Schauer, ibid, fn 48, where he gives further examples.  
50 O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1881), 1.  
51 This assumption lies at the heart of M.A. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (Cambridge, Mass. 
and London: Harvard University Press, 1988), conceptualised as ‘social propositions’. 
52 Northern Securities Co v United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes dissenting) quoted by Schauer, n 
2 above, 884.  
53 See Schauer, ibid, 890-911 and also n 3 above, 110-112. See Rachlinski, n 44 above, for an evaluation of 
the relative merits of the two modes of lawmaking (legislative and judicial).  
54 See E. Sherwin, ‘Judges as Rulemakers’ (2006) 73 University of Chicago Law Review 919.  
55 Which is of course harder, but not impossible, to design in the context of constitutional adjudication. 
See particularly Devins and Fisher, n 43 above, 217-239.  
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To a great extent, it is still Marbury v Madison,56 which continues to shape the 
vision of what the Supreme Court should be doing, apart from the textual 
limitations of Article III of the US Constitution.57 There are two conflicting views: 
the ‘dispute resolution’ (or ‘private right’) model on the one hand and the ‘public 
rights model’ on the other.58  
The first, dispute-resolution model reflects the traditional conception of 
adjudication as the resolution of disputes between two parties and the 
enforcement of their rights. It is characterised by Marshall in Marbury: ‘the 
province of the Court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals’.59 Rule-
making is a mere coincidence in the course of the resolution of a dispute.60  
This does not necessarily mean that the case in this model must be defined by 
factual circumstances. Especially in constitutional adjudication, but also when 
interpreting statutes, concrete facts do not matter.61 The case can be defined by a 
legal issue presented to the Court for its decision.62 Consider the Court’s rule: 
‘[o]nly the questions set forth in the petition [for certiorari], or fairly included 
therein, will be considered by the Court’.63 It is true that the Court can be quite 
flexible in what it considers to be ‘fairly included’ in the questions set forth in the 
petition, but, as Hartnett notes, ‘the leading treatise urges counsel not to phrase 
their questions presented in terms of error correction’.64 So, for example, in Roper 
v Simmons one of the questions presented for review was: ‘Is the imposition of the 
death penalty on a person who commits a murder at age seventeen “cruel and 
unusual”, and thus barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?’65 
Although the factual circumstances of the case are quite shocking – Simmons was 
a minor who, at the age of 17, together with one accomplice, broke into the home 
of their victim (an older woman), tied her up, and threw her off a bridge so that 
she drowned (all this having been planned beforehand), the question before the 
Court was fairly abstract and general, and the Court addressed it in that manner.66 
                                                     
56 n 18 above.  
57 The ‘case or controversy requirement’.  
58 See Fallon, et al, n 28 above, 67-73 with further references.  
59 Marbury v Madison, n 18 above, 170.  
60 See also a quotation from Marshall’s opinion, n 18 above.  
61 See S.J. Bayern, ‘Interpreting Case’ (2009) 36 Florida State University Law Review 125, 169-170. There are 
instances, however, when facts do matter in constitutional interpretation, for example when the Court 
crafts a rule based on some actual situation or empirical evidence submitted to it. But again, the particular 
case before the Court (and its facts) is not what matters. These facts represent a wider (factual) 
phenomenon, and that matters. See D.L. Faigman, Constitutional Fictions: A Unified Theory of Constitutional 
Facts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), particularly 63-86.  
62 See particularly M. Dorf, ‘Dicta and Article III’ (1994) 142 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1997 for 
such an approach.  
63 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 14.1(a), 28 U.S.C.A. See particularly Yee v City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535-538 
(1992) for rationales behind this rule. 
64 ‘Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years after the Judges’ Bill’ (2000) 100 Columbia 
Law Review 1643.  
65 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
66 Justice Kennedy writing for the Court started his analysis in the following way: ‘The prohibition against 
“cruel and unusual punishments”, like other expansive language in the Constitution, must be interpreted 
according to its text, by considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for its purpose 
and function in the constitutional design.’ 543 U.S. 551, 560. 
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But it might still be possible to distinguish elements of the decision which are 
more relevant for the Court’s conclusion than others, albeit only imprecisely.67 
In contrast, the second, public-rights model implies that what the court is 
doing has significance beyond the particular dispute before it. The Supreme Court 
is not ‘a mere settler of disputes, but rather […] an institution with a distinctive 
capacity to declare and explicate public values’.68 This role of the Court is 
reinforced by its power to select the cases it wants to hear. Clearly, the interests of 
the parties or the need to resolve their particular dispute are only secondary to the 
Court’s main aim: to set a uniform rule which will be binding on other courts and 
possibly also on other actors. From that perspective, whatever the Court says 
matters. Especially in the hierarchical context, as Schauer observes, ‘the advocate 
in a lower court urging a result plainly inconsistent with the language in the higher 
court opinion has a steep uphill climb, and arguments that the obstructing 
language is mere dicta, or not part of the ratio decidendi, are usually unavailing’.69 
But even if such model is adopted, it does not necessarily mean that the case 
becomes irrelevant for determining the scope of the holding. What differs is the 
definition of the case – the case is not the dispute between the parties, but rather 
an abstract issue presented to the Court. 
The relevance of the case in which the precedent court adopted its decision 
establishing the norm ‘implicated’ in it gives subsequent courts a flexibility which 
legislative rules do not allow.70 I mentioned that the Supreme Court’s supervision 
of lower courts is relatively limited.71 The Court cannot correct every 
misinterpretation of law, including in its own precedents. Scholars have noted that 
in order to know ‘what the law is’ one must look at decisions made by federal 
Courts of Appeal, since they are authoritative pronouncements of federal law in 
the absence of a clear precedent of the Supreme Court.72 Not only do lower courts 
effectively fill in the gaps left by the Supreme Court’s precedents, but they can also 
substantively reformulate their original scope and function as authentic 
expositions of federal law. Sometimes they can effectively resist them, without 
rebelling openly. It can be illustrated by the title of a recently published article: 
‘What if the Supreme Court held a constitutional revolution and nobody [meaning 
the lower and state courts] came?’73  
                                                     
67 Schauer, n 3 above, 181-182 (and also 54-56) is somewhat sceptical about the ability to identify reasons 
which were ‘necessary’ for the court to adopt a particular outcome, but himself asserts that ‘this idea 
should not be taken too far’, providing examples of statement made by judges which can be clearly 
characterised as dicta.  
68 Fallon, et al, n 28 above, 68. 
69 Schauer, n 2 above, 57-58.  
70 It is not suggest that legislated rules are more determinate or that they allow less flexibility. But, 
contrary to precedent, their interpretation is not inextricably intertwined with a particular case.  
71 See the text to n 24 above.  
72 See B. Friedman, ‘The Politics of Judicial Review’ (2005) 84 Texas L. Rev. 257, 302-308.  
73 G.H. Reynolds and B.P. Denning, ‘Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the Supreme Court 
Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?’ (2000) Wisconsin Law Review 369. For a discussion 
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Emancipating precedent from the confines of the case  
However, the importance of the case seems to diminish in certain contexts. James 
Pfander has recently observed that the US federal courts increasingly tend to say 
what the law is regardless of the context of a dispute and calls this ‘the principle of 
expositional supremacy’.74 For example, when federal courts decide on the liability 
of state officials, they must identify the applicable constitutional standard of 
officials’ conduct before they address the question of official immunity, which 
would prevent any suit from succeeding regardless of the applicable constitutional 
standard of official behaviour. Courts are therefore required to lay down a 
constitutional standard (if the standard was not clear before) and only then to decide 
whether it is relevant for deciding the case at hand. The Court justifies such an 
approach in the following way: ‘Deciding the constitutional question before 
addressing the qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal 
standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general 
public.’75  
A different phenomenon which has the same effect – giving the Court more 
control over the subsequent application of its precedent – concerns the 
diminishing importance of the holding/dicta distinction. Now I do not mean its 
flexibility (or malleability), which weakens the control exercised by the precedent 
court over subsequent decision makers. I mean the assumption that whatever the 
precedent court says matters. Some federal courts of appeal require lower courts 
to follow not only holdings, but also the dicta of their precedents – a trend which 
has recently provoked thorough criticism by a circuit court of appeal judge.76 As I 
noted above, this approach is based on the public rights model.  
Finally, the way in which the Court drafts its decisions also undermines the 
case-bound conception of precedent. As Frederick Schauer observed in 1995, ‘It is 
a routine charge against contemporary judicial opinions that they read more like 
statutes than like opinions of a court.’77 Defending this approach, Schauer 
highlights the function of a judicial opinion to ‘guid[e] lower courts and legally 
advised actors’78 and submits that ‘it may be appropriate to think of opinion 
writing as (at least in part) a conscious process of rule-making’.79 Schauer contends 
that ‘judicial rule-making is no less important than rule-making by other bodies, 
                                                                                                                                       
of state courts’ freedom not to follow the Supreme Court’s precedent see F.M. Bloom, ‘State Courts 
Unbound’ (2008) 93 Cornell Law Review 501.  
74 See Pfander, n 25 above, 291-295. For a critique of unnecessarily wide judgments which deal with 
questions unrelated to the disputes in which they are delivered see T. Healy, ‘The Rise of Unnecessary 
Constitutional Rulings’ (2005) 83 North Carolina Law Review 847. Healy even contends that such rulings 
can breach the constitutional prohibition against advisory opinions. ibid, 895-921.  
75 Wilson v Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).  
76 P.N. Leval, ‘Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta’ (2006) 81 New York University Law 
Review 1249.  
77 F. Schauer, ‘Opinions as Rules’ (1995) 62 University of Chicago Law Review 1455, 1455.  
78 ibid, 1469.  
79 ibid, 1470.  
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and no less likely to be constrained and informed by the kinds of considerations 
we would employ with respect to any other rule-making enterprise.’80  
But here we reach the difficult question of the democratic legitimacy of 
judicial lawmaking. Legal certainty and predictability provided by opinions drafted 
in this way are not the only considerations that matter. Michael Dorf argues: 
 
Schauer is surely correct that, other things being equal, whenever notice is an 
important value, statute-like judicial opinions will be preferable to vaguer, 
more principle-like judicial opinions. But other things are rarely equal. There 
are legitimacy costs that arise out of a court’s attempt to emulate a legislature, 
because legislatures and courts derive their legitimacy from different 
sources.81  
 
Dorf’s concern is precisely what I discussed above: the possibility of later courts  
modifying the rule implicated in the precedent decision. Dorf explains that ‘more 
statute-like opinion entails more particular commitments’82 and contends that 
Schauer does not ‘explain why we would want our courts to commit themselves in 
the future to the concrete applications the present judges happen to favor in cases 
not currently before them’.83 
In sum, precedent unbound from the particular case in which the judicial 
decision forming its basis was made gives more control to the Supreme Court – 
the court which pronounces rules which are relatively independent of the cases 
before it. The traditional common law concept of precedent is significantly 
redrawn.  
 
 
 
THE COUR DE CASSATION: JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CIVIL 
CODE 
 
JUDICIAL LAWMAKING AS A CREATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL CODE  
 
According to Lasser, ‘The most basic foundational idea of the French legal and 
political order has traditionally been that the legislature, and the legislature alone, is 
supposed to have law-making power.’84 This idea goes back to the French 
revolution, which learned from the Ancien Régime’s Parlements’ usurpation of power, 
                                                     
80 ibid, 1470-1471.  
81 M.C. Dorf, ‘Courts, Reasons, and Rules’ (2000) 19 Quinnipiac Law Review 483, 490.  
82 ibid, 495.  
83 ibid, 499.  
84 M. De S-O-L’E Lasser, Judicial Deliberations. A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 168-169.  
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and is duly reflected in all standard comparative accounts.85 According to Lasser, 
the republican ideology insists that ‘[j]udges in some important sense cannot usurp 
[the] legislative law making power because law is defined categorically as legislative 
in origin’.86 This does not mean that the French are ‘blind to the fact that judges 
play a significant role in the elaboration, development, and modification of 
normative rules’.87 This awareness is ‘hardly recent’, and Lasser recalls Portalis, the 
primary author of the French Civil Code, who highlighted the inability ‘to predict 
and settle everything’ and referred to ‘the judge and the jurisconsults, penetrated 
by the general spirit of the [codified] laws, to direct their application’.88 Still, 
according to Lasser the French conception of law is ‘above all a legal rule (or a set 
of legal rules) that has been formally adopted by the legislature in the form of “loi” 
(legislation)’.89  
Lasser considers the American approach to comparative law parochial, 
arguing that it is based on the ‘American realist definition of law, [which] when 
applied uncritically to a civilian – and especially to the French – legal system, 
leaves little or no possibility of encountering that system.’90 In a series of works 
culminating in Judicial Deliberations,91 Lasser stresses that the French legal system 
employs a concept of law and legality which is fundamentally different from the 
American realist account of law. While his account is insightful, I think the 
presentation of the French doctrine of sources of law is incorrect.92  
Malaurie and Morvan write that ‘the majority of authors recognize jurisprudence 
as a source of law’.93 Whilst this statement may be an exaggeration (since 
considerable debate about jurisprudence remains),94 it is certainly not taboo to 
‘accord [jurisprudence] the exalted statues of a true “source of law”’, as Lasser 
suggests. Jestaz, another renowned French civilist, introduces his book on the 
                                                     
85 See eg J.H. Merryman, ‘The French Deviation’ (1996) 44 American Journal of Comparative Law 109, 109-
110 and J.P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Law School, 1968), 
373.  
86 Lasser, n 84 above, 169.  
87 ibid.  
88 ibid, 171, quoting (in Lasser’s translation) J.-E.-M. Portalis, Discours préliminaire du premier projet de Code 
civil (1801). The complete Discours together with a number of essays dealing with different topics 
concerning the Civil Code, was published as F. Terre (ed), Le discours et le code: Portalis deux siècles après le 
Code Napoléon (Paris: LexisNexis Litec, 2004).  
89 Lasser, n 84 above, 169.  
90 ‘Comparative Readings of Roscoe Pound’s Jurisprudence’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 
719.  
91 Apart from Lasser, ibid, see also Lasser, ‘Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French 
Legal System’ (1995) 104 Yale Law Journal 1325 and ‘Do Judges Deploy Policy?’ (2001) 22 Cardozo Law 
Review 863.  
92 For a more thorough evaluation of Lasser, n 84 above, see my review article, ‘Questioning Judicial 
Deliberations’ (2009) 29 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 805.  
93 P. Malaurie and P. Morvan, Droit civil: introduction générale (Paris: Defrénois, 2nd ed, 2005), 265 with 
further references. See also J. Ghestin, G. Goubeaux, and M. Fabre-Magnan, Traité de droit civil. Introduction 
générale / sous la direction de Jacques Ghestin (Paris: LGDJ, 4th ed, 1994), 192-204; P. Jestaz, Les sources du droit 
(Paris: Dalloz, 2005).  
94 See J. Carbonnier, Droit civil. Introduction (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 21st ed, 1992), 263-
282. 
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sources of law in the following way: ‘For centuries, the designation “sources of 
law” serves to mark la loi, la jurisprudence, la coutume, etc.’95 This speaks for itself.  
Much depends on how we define ‘the law’.96 The real debate in France turns 
on this, together with the place of jurisprudence and the judiciary in general within 
the French legal system. The debate considers the legitimacy of judicially created 
norms and their normative effects beyond particular cases; in this respect the 
French debate is not so very different from the debates taking place in other legal 
systems. It is true that ‘[o]ne need hardly call judicial decision-making “law” in 
order to stress that judges make normative choices and thus exercise highly 
significant normative authority’.97 But that is exactly how it is termed in French – 
la création du droit par le juge.98 This can safely be translated as ‘judicial lawmaking’.  
Judicial creative activity is based on different premises from those put 
forward by Lasser. These premises can be found in Portalis’s Discours préliminaire: 
 
There is a science for the legislator, as there is one for the judges; and the one 
does not resemble the other. The science of the legislator consist in finding, 
in each matter, the principles most favourable to the common good; the 
science of the judge is to put these principles in action, to develop them, to 
extend them, by a wise and reasoned application, to private relations; to study 
the spirit of the law when the letter kills, and not to expose himself to the risk 
of being alternatively slave and rebel, or to disobey because of a servile 
spirit.99 
 
Judicial lawmaking (création du droit) is put forward as a creative interpretation of the 
Code; an interpretation which may go well beyond the Code’s wording, while 
retaining its spirit. This creativity exceeds mere clarification; occasionally filling the 
gaps; or reconciling possible antinomies. Judicial creation extends to adapting law 
to meet societal developments.100  
                                                     
95 Jestaz, n 93 above, 1.  
96 See Malaurie and Morvan, n 93 above, 264-266 (these authors note that the debate is often a ‘dialogue 
of the deaf’, since each participant has a different conception of law in mind); Ghestin, et al, n 93 above, 
451; Jestaz, ibid, 1-8.  
97 ibid.  
98 Which is a title of (2007) 50 Archives de philosophie du droit.  
99 Terre (ed), n 88 above, xxix. The translation was taken from A.T. von Mehren and J.R. Gordley, The 
Civil Law System: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (Boston, Mass. and Toronto: Little, Brown, 
2nd ed, 1977), 55. See on this part of Le Discours, B. Teyssié, ‘Corpus juris’, in Terre (ed), n 88 above. 
100 See eg A. Tunc, ‘La méthode du droit civil: analyse des conceptions françaises’ (1975) Revue 
internationale de droit compare   817, 821; Ghestin, et al, n 93 above, 434-442 (both expressly referring to 
Portalis); J. Foyer, ‘Loi et jurisprudence’ in Terre (ed), n 88 above, 28; Teyssié, n 99 above, 50-52 ; F. 
Zénati, La jurisprudence (Paris: Dalloz, 2001), 221-224; and particularly P. Deumier, ‘Création du droit et 
rédaction des arrêts par la Cour de cassation’ (2007) 50 Archives de philosophie du droit 49. It also true, 
however, that Portalis added: ‘We leave to [jurisprudence] the rare and extraordinary cases that do not enter 
into the plan of a rational legislation, the very variable and very disputed details that should not occupy 
the legislator at all, and all the things that it would be futile to try and foresee or that a premature 
foresight could not provide for without danger.’ in Terre (ed), n 88 above, xxix (translation von Mehren 
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At the same time, judicial creativity is presented as circumscribed by the Code 
or, more precisely, its spirit. Judges cannot ‘rebel’ against the Code and become 
completely free. Thus Tunc contends that experience contradicts the statement of 
Justice Holmes in Lochner that ‘general propositions do not decide concrete 
cases’,101 ‘a phrase which [according to Tunc] seems to be self-evident, but which 
is in no way justified by reality and which unfortunately inspires thousands of 
common law lawyers to distrust of regards codification which lacks any 
grounds’.102 While Tunc’s view seems to be a naïve endorsement of the Code’s 
power to constrain the judges (but only at first sight), a similar foundational belief 
(or arguments against it) surrounds the debate about interpretation of the US 
Constitution and freedom it gives to [the] judges.103 Holmes’ position is a neat 
slogan, but by no means universally accepted in the US context.104 
The force with which the (spirit of the) Code constrains judges is relative. 
This is more so once general principles of law are accepted, since these principles 
enable judicial creativity to ‘acquire[ a very particular autonomy’.105 The Cour de 
Cassation does not pretend to ground the general principles in a specific provision 
of the Code but relies on them as the sole basis for its decisions.106 However, the 
central idea remains: it is on the basis of the (spirit of the) Code that the judges 
formulate the principles.  
The prohibition on denying justice on grounds of silence, obscurity, or 
insufficiency of the legislation,107 at the time of the Code’s inception the 
expression of its creators’ belief in its completeness,108 has become a source of the 
normative power of courts and is now read as a duty to say what the law is.109  
The notion of a judge who would be ‘no more than the mouth that 
pronounces the words of the law’110 was, according to Zénati, abandoned much 
                                                                                                                                       
and Gordley, ibid). Subsequent developments showed that the cases not presupposed by the legislator 
were far from ‘rare and extraordinary’. 
101 Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
102 Tunc, n 100 above, 822.  
103 Perhaps the best US counterpart (I stress, far from uncontroversial) would be Ronald Dworkin, or, 
improbable as it may seem, Roscoe Pound. See R. Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Introduction to Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2003), who at 162 compares 
Dworkin to Pound, in that the former ‘sees the judge as deriving both the authority to develop law and 
the resources to do so from within law itself’. 
104 See the text to n 21 above. 
105 Ghestin, et al, n 93 above, 470. Jestaz, n 93 above, 23-26 lists the principles among ‘the sources 
coming from the top’, where he puts revelation, enacted law (la loi), and judgments (he uses this term to 
denote a more general category than jurisprudence), but autonomous from the Code.  
106 See Ghestin, et al, ibid, 459-465; Malaurie and Morvan, n 93 above, 276-277 and C. Atias, ‘L’ambiguïté 
des arrêts dits de principe en droit privé’ (1984) Semaine juridique, édition générale I-3145.  
107 Article 4 of the Civil Code: ‘A judge who refuses to give judgment on the pretext of legislation being 
silent, obscure or insufficient, may be prosecuted for being guilty of a denial of justice.’ (translation from 
Legifrance, an official website of the French Government, at <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr> – all other 
translations of the French legislation are from this source). 
108 See n 100 above.  
109 Obligation ‘de dire le droit’. See Malaurie and Morvan, n 93 above, 278 and also P. Malaurie, ‘Les 
précédents et le droit: rapport français’ in Hondius (ed), n 10 above, 143.  
110 Montesquieu, A.M. Cohler, B.C. Miller, and H.S. Stone (eds and trans), The Spirit of the Laws 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) (1748), 163. As K.M. Schönfeld, ‘Rex, Lex et Judex: 
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earlier than is generally believed; référé legislatif, a symbol of distrust of the judiciary, 
was dysfunctional long before it was formally abolished in 1828.111 As Zénati 
argues, it is a mistake to consider the Cour de cassation as a judicial body. Instead 
it is a body outside the judiciary, the mission of which is not, in Robespierre’s 
words, ‘to judge the citizens, but to protect enacted laws’. In other words, the 
Tribunal (later turned into the Cour) was created to protect the sovereign will of 
the people, embodied in the law, against encroachment upon it by the ordinary 
courts. According to Zénati, the Cour de cassation has two principal tasks: to 
protect the unity of the legislation and to serve as a guardian of the principle of the 
separation of powers. The latter task can seem contradictory to its nature – how 
can a court be a protector against other courts? However, this is contradictory 
only if we think of the Cour as a judicial body and not as a quasi-legislator. We will 
see further what consequences such an understanding of the Cour has for its 
jurisprudence. 
 
WHO IS CONSTRAINED?  
 
Does it follow that if the Cour de Cassation makes law then the product of this 
‘making’ (ie judicial decision) is automatically binding on others? No. We must 
distinguish between making law in a particular case, which refers to a situation in 
which the judge’s decision is not constrained by the existing sources (however 
defined), and making the judge’s creation binding on others. Much of the 
discussion about the lawmaking power of civilian judges focuses on the first 
question and somewhat confuses this with the second question. For example 
Dawson calls a ‘subsidiary issue’ the question of ‘the extent to which courts should 
be bound by high court decisions’,112 when considering the German courts’, 
particularly the Reichsgericht’s, practice of disregarding statutory provisions on the 
basis of general clauses contained in the German Civil Code, particularly that on 
good faith.113 Dawson notes that the debate on whether Germany should have a 
                                                                                                                                       
Montesquieu and la bouche de la loi revisited’ (2008) 4 European Constitutional Law Review 274 shows, 
however, this phrase was taken out of the context of The Spirit of the Laws, and Montesquieu did not mean 
it in the sense generally ascribed to it today. 
111 Référé legislatif was a procedure introduced in 1790, which imposed a duty on the (then) Tribunal de 
cassation to refer a question of interpretation of law to the legislator if the Tribunal was disagreed with 
three consecutive times by the lower court in the same case. See Dawson, n 85 above, 378-379. A 
provision making the decision of the Cour de cassation on a second appeal in cassation binding on the 
lower court was introduced only in 1837. This, together with abolition of the référé legislatif (in 1828), was 
of paramount importance for establishing the Cour de cassation’s authority. On the significance of these 
two changes see F. Zénati, ‘La nature de la Cour de cassation’ (Bulletin d’information de la Cour de cassation 
no. 575, 15 April 2003), at <http://www.courdecassation.fr> (The printed version was not available to 
me, so I could not provide more precise references); Zénati, n 100 above, 71; Ghestin, et al, n 93 above, 
416-418). According to (current) Article L.431-6 of the Code on the organisation of the judiciary, the 
second cassation based on the same legal grounds (moyens) must be heard by the Full Court (l’assemblée 
plénière).  
112 Dawson, n 85 above, 487.  
113 See ibid, 461-479.  
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system of following previous decisions ‘ha[d] a weird, other worldly quality, [since 
according to him] Germany already had a precedent system working order’.114 
That remark is, I suspect, based on the failure to distinguish the two issues. 
In France the distinction between judicial lawmaking and the normative force 
of law made in this way is much clearer due to the express prohibition on arrêts de 
règlement contained in Article 5 of the Civil Code.115 Arrêts de règlement, decisions 
made by the pre-revolutionary courts (Parlements) in particular disputes, but 
announcing an abstract and general rule which was binding on all courts within the 
jurisdiction of the Parlement which issued them, were the symbols of the excessive 
judicial power of courts, and thus expressly prohibited.116 Therefore to admit that 
judges make law in the first sense (ie for a particular case before them) does not 
explain the extent to which other courts or participants in the legal system are 
bound by such rules. And Article 5 prevents any open recognition of the general 
binding force of prior decisions. This is further reinforced by Article 1351 of the 
Code, which establishes only the relative force of res judicata, limiting it to the 
particular case decided by the court.117 These two provisions (together with Article 
4)118 form the framework within which the French debate on the normative 
effects of jurisprudence takes place and which shapes many arguments which can 
seem formalistic and blind to crude reality. In fact, they are elaborated responses 
to the express limitations embodied in the Code by the Enlightenment legal 
thinkers.  
Cassation, whereby the Cour de cassation quashes a lower court’s decision 
and sends it back to another court for the final decision (while the Cour’s review is 
limited to points of law – les moyens),119 and the Cour’s wide supervisory power 
over the lower courts are the crucial elements giving the Cour’s jurisprudence its 
force.  
Cassation is conceived as a sanction imposed on lower judges (juges du fond) 
for disobeying the legislator.120 The Cour de cassation is a ‘secular arm of the 
legislated law’ (le bras séculier de la loi). It therefore does not need to justify its 
interpretation of the law; to do so would only weaken it – ‘imperatoria brevitas of the 
                                                     
114 ibid, 484.  
115 ‘Judges are forbidden to decide cases submitted to them by way of general and regulatory provisions.’ 
On arrêts de règlement in general see Dawson, n 85 above, 305-314.  
116 In the revolutionary period it was truly believed that judges should exercise no normative power, if 
only by interpreting laws enacted by the legislator; thus Robespierre’s famous desire to erase the word 
jurisprudence from the French language. See Zénati, n 100 above, 45-55.  
117 ‘The force of res judicata takes place only with respect to what was the subject matter of a judgment. 
It is necessary that the thing claimed be the same; that the claim be based on the same grounds; that the 
claim be between the same parties and brought by them and against them in the same capacity.’  
118 See n 107 above.  
119 On cassation see S.M.F. Geeroms, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Translation: Why the Terms 
Cassation, Revision and Appeal Should Not Be Translated...’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 
201, 204-208, who also discusses changes in the scope of the Cour’s review and its ability finally to 
dispose of the case itself.  
120 As Zénati, n 100 above, 43 says, cassation was introduced to the French procedure by the King in the 
18th century for the same purpose: to control judicial obedience to the royal authority.  
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supreme judgments borrows the concise and closed style of enacted laws’.121 Such 
a conceptualisation of the Cour in fact corresponds to Austin’s conception of a 
judge as the sovereign’s delegate:  
 
The portion of the sovereign power which lies at [the judge’s] disposition is 
merely delegated. The rules which he makes derive their legal force from 
authority given by the state: an authority which the state may confer 
expressly, but which it commonly imparts in the way of acquiescence.122 
 
For Zénati, the delegation of power to the Cour is crucial for determining the legal 
effects of its jurisprudence. Jurisprudence borrows the legal effects from the 
interpreted rules, but at the same time is seen as a separate source of law, 
supported by a sanction – cassation. In this respect Zénati distinguishes his 
conceptualisation from the ‘incorporation theory’, which suggested that the Cour’s 
interpretations of a legislative norm are incorporated into it and must have the 
same effects. On this basis Zénati distinguishes the jurisprudence of the Cour from 
that of lower courts. Because of the sanction in the form of cassation only the 
former is a true source of law.123  
The authority of the Cour de cassation’s jurisprudence is imposed through its 
wide supervisory power. This power was supported by the ideology of 
‘intermediate law’, which ‘recognised all citizens’ power to impose on a judge 
[understood as a lower judge, “juge du fond”] respect for the law.’124 An attentive 
reader will perhaps note how similar this sounds to the Court of Justice’s doctrine 
of direct effect and its use for the purposes of private enforcement of EU law by 
ordinary citizens.125 The Cour has always dealt with a much greater number of 
cases than courts in countries where the supreme courts’ authority has rested on 
different grounds.126 At the same time, as regards the lower courts its power to 
impose its interpretation is absolute, since after the second cassation the lower 
court is bound by the Cour de cassation’s interpretation of the law.127 Zénati 
contends that the only freedom which the lower courts have is to do mischief and 
                                                     
121 Zénati, n 111 above.  
122 S. Austin (ed), The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: John Murray, 2nd ed, 1861), 25.  
123 See Zénati, n 100 above, 129-130 and 221. Dawson, n 85 above, 416-431 summarises an earlier French 
debate on the status of jurisprudence among the sources of law, including the incorporation theory.  
124 ibid. See also Zénati, ibid, 49-55.  
125 See eg C.W.A. Timmermans, ‘Judicial Protection Against the Member States: Articles 169 and 177 
Revisited’ in D. Curtin and T. Heukels (eds), 2 Institutional Dynamics of European Integration. Essays in Honour 
of Henry G. Schermers (Dordrecht and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994). 
126 This applies not only to supreme courts in common law jurisdictions but also to supreme courts based 
on the German model. For a comparison of different review models see Geeroms, n 119 above 
(providing a rich historical account of different models of review, and noting at 215 that the German 
revision model ‘as a reaction against the cassation ideal, [...] explicitly intended not to supervise the lower 
court. Instead, its primary purpose was, and still is, the assurance of uniformity in case law and the 
harmonious development of existing law without disregarding the interests of the parties’).  
127 See n 111 above.  
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be exposed to sanction in the form of cassation.128 We will see below, when I 
discuss the nature of jurisprudence’s force, that this is not completely true and that it 
is important that lower courts do sometimes disobey. 
The concept of lawmaking as creative interpretation finds its limits when the 
Cour wants to change the existing jurisprudence. Overturning (revirement de la 
jurisprudence) conflicts with the principle of legal certainty, the French doctrine 
therefore debated the possibility of limiting the effects of overturning only for the 
future. After a group of academics and practitioners submitted a report to the First 
President of the Cour,129 the Cour actually declared that it had such 
competence.130 Morvan considers this to mark the crossing of the Rubicon,131 
since it is taken as proof of the lawmaking power of the Cour132 – now openly 
admitted by the Cour itself. One is then faced with the prohibition of arrêts de 
règlement imposed on the French civil courts by Article 5 of the Civil Code. But 
here remains another important element of the normative effects of jurisprudence: 
its relationship with the legislator.  
Portalis predicted the creative role of judges and their jurisprudence.133 He 
writes: ‘It is necessary that the legislator keep an eye on [jurisprudence]. He can learn 
from it and he can, for his part, correct it.’134 In the words of the today’s 
commentator, this is ‘essential’, since ‘while it was not possible to keep the system 
which reserved interpretation of the law to the legislator by way of référé legislatif, 
the democratic principle commands recognizing the legislator’s power, and even a 
duty, to erase jurisprudence which it considers erroneous, shocking or 
inappropriate’.135  
This is also why the Cour produces its annual reports, although their role has 
changed since, while ‘[i]nitially conceived as an instrument of the subordination of 
the [Cour de cassation] to the legislative power, they became an instrument of 
diffusion of the jurisprudential innovations and the normative policy of the 
supreme court’.136  
The idea of ‘lawmaking as creative interpretation’ permits the borrowing of 
the effects of the interpreted rules, but at the same time contains a constraining 
                                                     
128 Zénati, n 100 above, 182, quoting J. Maury, ‘Observations sur la jurisprudence en tant que source du 
droit’ in 1 Études offertes au Georges Ripert (Paris: LGDJ, 1950), 49. 
129 N. Molfessis (ed), Les revirements de jurisprudence: rapport remis à monsieur le premier président Guy Canivet, 
mardi 30 novembre 2004 (Paris: Litec, 2005).  
130 Cour de Cassation, Deuxième chambre civile, 8 July 2004 [Case No 01-10.426], Bull. civ. II No 387, 
374, at <http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/deuxieme_chambre_civile_570/arret_no_689. 
html>. See P. Deumier, ‘Evolutions du pouvoir de modulation dans le temps: fondement et mode 
d’emploi d’un nouveau pouvoir des juges’ (2007) Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 72, mapping more recent 
developments (also in the Conseil d’Etat).  
131 P. Morvan, ‘Le revirement de jurisprudence pour l’avenir: humble adresse aux magistrats ayant franchi 
le Rubicon’ (2005) Dalloz, Chronique 247.  
132 See eg Malaurie and Morvan, n 93 above, 269-274. 
133 See the text to n 88 and n 99 above.  
134 Terre (ed), n 88 above, xxix (translation von Mehren and Gordley, n 99 above).  
135 Foyer, n 100 above, 28.  
136 Zénati, n 111 above. On annual reports see also De S-O-L’E Lasser, n 84 above, 199-200.  
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element: the legislator can always undo jurisprudence it dislikes.137 That is why 
Ghestin, who classifies jurisprudence as a source of law, at the same time opposes 
abolishing the prohibition of the arrêts de règlement. According to Ghestin, 
jurisprudence would acquire the same status as enacted law, which could lead to 
irreconcilable conflicts between the two.138  
However, according to Zénati such conflict cannot arise, precisely because of 
the unity between enacted laws and the jurisprudence which interprets them. If the 
text of an enacted law contradicts previous jurisprudence, it must be seen as 
amending it, and vice versa. If there is a contradiction between jurisprudence 
interpreting a hierarchically subordinate norm on the one hand, and the text of an 
enacted norm superior to it on the other, it must be conceived as if the Cour was 
also implicitly interpreting the superior norm.139 This of course holds only 
theoretically, and it can find its limits in the very clear wording of the text of the 
enacted norm; in practice some scholars talk about contra legem jurisprudence.140 Be 
that as it may, an increasing number of academics question whether the 
prohibition of the arrêts de règlement has any real meaning.141  
 
THE NATURE OF JURISPRUDENCE’S CONSTRAINT: LEGISLATIVE PRECEDENT  
 
If we think of the Cour de cassation as the secular arm of legislated law, we cannot 
expect it to provide extensive reasoning: imperatoria brevitas says Zénati. The brevity 
of the decision is something which constantly perplexes observers from other legal 
systems, who also stress the scanty treatment of facts in the Cour’s decisions.142 
Dawson comments on the brevity of the Cour de cassation’s judgments in the 
following way:  
 
To readers trained in our own tradition [the US], the extreme parsimony of its 
statements of facts is even more striking than the brevity of its propositions 
of law. It is not only striking but in a way more important, for it raises issues 
that are central not only to workable case-law technique but to conceptions of 
the kind of law that judges are qualified to make.143 
 
                                                     
137 This construction however encounters two fundamental problems: one concerning general principles 
of law, which, once formulated by the Cour, can be ‘corrected’ by the legislator only to a limited extent 
(see particularly P. Morvan, Le principe de droit privé (Paris: Panthéon-Assas, 1999), 735-749), and another 
related to the control of the compatibility of the legislation with international treaties (including EU law) 
binding on France (see eg Ghestin, et al, n 93 above, 248-258).  
138 Ghestin, et al, ibid, 446-448.  
139 Zénati, n 100 above, 224.  
140 Malaurie and Morvan, n 93 above, 276.  
141 As early as 1958 see A. Audinet, ‘Faut-il ressusciter les arrêts de règlement’ in Mélanges offerts à Jean 
Brèthe de la Gressaye (Bordeaux: Bière, 1967) referring to H. Sinay, ‘La résurgence des arrêts de règlement’ 
(1958) Dalloz, Chronique 85. See also Malaurie and Morvan, n 93 above, 280-281 and Zénati, n 100 above, 
214-218.  
142 See Lasser, n 84 above, 28 and 244.  
143 Dawson, n 85 above, 413.  
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By ‘workable case-law technique [and] conceptions of the kind of law that judges 
are qualified to make’ Dawson means what I described above as the centrality of 
the case and its facts for determining what is binding in the previous court’s 
decision, primarily by separating findings from dicta or possibly distinguishing the 
case before the judges from that which led to a precedent decision. Extensive 
reasoning of the precedent judgment then serves as a means of limiting the rule-
making power of the precedent court: it is the subsequent court which defines the 
scope of holdings and can possibly distinguish the subsequent case on the basis of 
the facts before it, or at least on the basis of what the court said.  
The whole concept of cassation speaks against the limiting of the Cour de 
cassation in this way. Unlike the US Supreme Court, the Cour is not part of the 
judicial system; it is a secular arm of the legislated law, which sanctions ordinary 
courts if they disrespect it. As Zénati notes, it ‘represses jurisprudence in the name of 
the legislated law’144 by not allowing a lower court to participate in the formulation 
of the ‘precedent’ rule and also by the way it reasons. Zénati therefore calls the 
Cour de cassation’s production ‘legislative jurisprudence’ and distinguishes it 
squarely from ‘genuine’ jurisprudence produced by other supreme courts which have 
full appellate jurisdiction. While the latter serve as model for lower courts, the 
Cour de cassation issues legislation-like rules and controls obedience to them.145 
Does this mean that the Cour de cassation is virtually unconstrained as a 
result of being liberated from the duty to reason in the way common law judges 
do?  
Here we can come to a paradoxical response to Dawson’s concerns: it is 
brevity itself which constrains the lawmaking activity of the Cour. In its decision 
the Cour is expected to deal only with specific legal146 grounds submitted in the 
appeal in cassation.147 At the same time, everything the Cour says in its judgment has 
immediate legal consequences for the process before the lower court;148 if there is 
a second appeal in cassation pursued on the basis of the same moyens, it will be the 
General Assembly of the Cour that will hear the case.149 And its decision is then 
binding (on the points of law) on the lower court – no other appeal is possible. 
The ability to raise an issue on its own motion is very limited, and the Cour uses it 
only rarely.150 The Cour de cassation is therefore far more constrained in what it 
can say in its decision than, for example, the US Supreme Court; it can thus 
produce fewer statements which can be taken as its authoritative pronouncements 
                                                     
144 Zénati, n 111 above.  
145 Zénati, n 100 above, 40-44, 177-180 and more explicitly Zénati, n 111 above.  
146 See Zenati-Castaing, n 161 above, 1557.  
147 ‘Appeal in cassation’ corresponds to ‘pourvoi en cassation’, while ‘legal grounds’ correspond to ‘moyens’; 
these are translations used by the European Court of Justice.  
148 And yet another translation – ‘lower court’ refers to ‘juge du fond’, ie the court the decision of which 
was appealed in cassation to the Cour de cassation.  
149 See n 127 above. 
150 Ghestin, et al, n 93 above, 474-475.  
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of law. Some authors even mention that dicta, which the Cour nevertheless 
occasionally utters, breach the prohibition on arrêts de règlement.151  
This understanding of the reasoning also explains why the Cour, after making 
public materials related to its decision, including the opinion of its avocat général and 
the report of the conseiller rapporteur, does not make them part of the official 
decision but puts them to one side,152 as travaux préparatoires. Their title of travaux 
préparatoires again suggests that Cour decisions are legislative works rather than a 
process of judicial deliberation, reminding us that the Cour is an adjunct to the 
legislator.153  
Most comparatists note that the Cour de cassation’s decisions pay only scant 
attention to the facts.154 We can understand why this is so, once we view cassation 
in the sense discussed by Zénati – as a sanction enforcing lower judges’ obedience 
to the legislated law and not as a mechanism for correcting individual injustices. 
For some scholars this is but an illustration of a much wider phenomenon dividing 
the common law and civil law traditions. While the former focuses on the 
particular and factual, the latter emphasises the general and abstract.155  
But is the notion of jurisprudence truly limited to a set of abstract norms 
expressed in legislation-like language contained in the Cour’s decisions? According 
to Zénati, the Cour ‘represses jurisprudence in the name of the legislated law’.156 
What does Zénati mean by this? Do the Cour’s decisions not form jurisprudence 
proper?  
For Zénati jurisprudence has a very special meaning of ‘prudence of the law’ (la 
prudence du droit). In that respect he refers to the Aristotelian virtue, prudence,157 
which is ‘turned towards the action [and] aims at determining the good and the 
                                                     
151 See Malaurie and Morvan, n 93 above, 280. This feature of brief judgments is well noted in [the] 
French comparative scholarship. See particularly H. Muir Watt, ‘La motivation des arrêts de la Cour de 
cassation et l’élaboration de la norme’ in N. Molfessis (ed), La Cour de cassation et l’élaboration du droit (Paris: 
Economica, 2004), 61.  
152 See Deumier, n 100 above, for a discussion of the different ways in which the Cour de cassation 
changes or could change its publication practices. On the trend of opening the Cour to the public 
generally see G. Canivet, ‘Formal and Informal Determinative Factors in the Legitimacy of Judicial 
Decisions: The Point of View of the French Court of Cassation’ in N. Huls, M. Adams, and J. Bomhoff 
(eds), The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ Rulings: Judicial Deliberations and Beyond (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2009), 125. 
153 I leave aside here the question of comprehensibility of the Cour’s judgments; despite some criticisms 
(among the most influential see A. Touffait and A. Tunc, ‘Pour une motivation plus explicite des 
décisions de justice notamment de celles de la Cour de cassation’ (1974) Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 487); 
many academics maintain that it is only a question of a special skill (which should be taught better, it is 
true) to understand the judgment of the Cour and its reasoning well. See particularly J. Ghestin, 
‘L’interprétation d’un arrêt de la Cour de cassation’ (2004) Dalloz, Chronique 2239. One should not 
overlook difficulties which the common law style of judgment drafting also causes; see eg A. Samuels, 
‘Those Multiple Long Judgments’ (2005) 24 Civil Justice Quarterly 279.  
154 See eg Lasser, n 84 above, 32; Dawson, n 85 above, 411.  
155 See particularly V. Grossvald Curran, ‘Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal 
Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union’ (2001) 7 Columbia Journal of European Law 
63, 75-111 with further references.  
156 n 144 above.  
157 In Greek (phronēsis), often translated as ‘practical wisdom’, which can create confusions, since wisdom 
is another virtue: (sophos).  
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bad for acting well’.158 Prudence is connected to a concrete factual situation, not a 
set of abstract norms. Zénati believes that ‘[w]hile the supreme courts of unlimited 
jurisdiction found the law in the prudence, the Cour de cassation searched for it in 
interpretation of the legal rules’.159 Due to the nature of cassation (concerned with 
proper application of law, not individual justice in the case being reviewed), there 
is no jurisprudence of the Cour, properly so called, since the Cour does not decide in 
the prudential mode.160  
Lower courts play a crucial role here. Unlike the Cour, they are facing ‘real-
life situations’ and see how the abstract rules are being applied in them.161 They 
therefore decide in the prudential mode, like courts with unlimited jurisdiction. So 
when an abstract rule contained in the Cour de cassation’s jurisprudence produces 
results which do not fit the conception of justice which would correspond to the 
situation before the lower courts, they can always try to provoke its change. The 
fact that the Cour de cassation’s jurisprudence is not officially binding on the lower 
courts is of crucial importance here. While they do not have the means of 
moderating the precedent rule like courts below the US Supreme Court, French 
lower courts are always free to depart from the Cour de cassation’s jurisprudence and 
invite the Cour to change it so that it is updated to reflect the needs of society.162 
In this way they incorporate experience into the life of the law – like doctrinal 
writers,163 who are in a constant dialogue with the Cour and can force it to a 
change.164  
 
 
 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: PROBLEMS OF AN 
INCOMPLETE TRANSLATION 
 
In the foregoing two parts I wanted to show how the conceptualisation of judicial 
lawmaking and the nature of precedential constraint in the US and France make 
the involvement of other actors – lower courts and legislators (or, more widely, 
political branches) – possible. In this section I want to argue that while the Court 
of Justice’s precedent in some respects resembles precedents in both systems, it 
does not contain (or does not employ in practice) the elements which achieve this. 
That is why I call this section ‘problems of an incomplete translation’.  
                                                     
158 Zénati, n 100 above, 86.  
159 Zénati, n 111 above.  
160 ibid.  
161 See F. Zenati-Castaing [the same author as that of La jurisprudence, n 100 above, and Zénati, n 111 
above], ‘La motivation des décisions de justice et les sources du droit’ (2007) Dalloz, Chronique 1553.  
162 On the role of the lower courts and their decisions see eg M.-A. Frison-Roche and S. Bories, ‘La 
jurisprudence massive’ (1993) Dalloz, Chronique 287.  
163 As I explain in n 16 above, I do not deal with doctrine in more detail here.  
164 See Zénati, n 100 above, 245-272 and in English J. Bell, French Legal Cultures (London, Edinburgh, 
Dublin: Butterworths, 2001), 72-88.  
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JUDICIAL LAWMAKING AS CREATIVE INTERPRETATION AND THE COURT OF 
JUSTICE’S SUPREMACY  
 
While both systems – the US and the French – acknowledge that judges ‘make 
law’, they also insist that this judicial lawmaking is based on creative interpretation 
of the foundational documents – the Constitution and the Civil Code. Both courts 
are often said to declare what these documents mean; they are not recognised as 
having an autonomous power to create norms which would be independent of the 
foundational document. In the US this understanding of judicial lawmaking 
activity (in the context of constitutional adjudication) allows other branches of 
government to claim that they can come up with competing interpretations of the 
Constitution. In France the fiction of ‘lawmaking as creative interpretation’ allows 
the legislator to control the Cour by adopting legislative provisions which correct 
interpretations adopted by the Cour.  
Of course, this is a rather idealised picture, since the idea of other branches’ 
involvement in constitutional interpretation is deeply contested in the US, and 
because in France it is possible to take the legislator out of the game – particularly 
by judicial control of legislation’s compatibility with the European Convention, 
European Union law, and the general principles of law. Moreover, the recent 
introduction of ex post constitutional review (on references from ordinary courts 
to the Conseil constitutionnel) has made the legislature’s control of the judiciary 
even more illusory.165 But these idealisations help to accommodate the normative 
effects of decisions of both courts beyond the context of the cases in which they 
are delivered and allow other actors – particularly the political process – to react.  
The Court of Justice’s judicial activity is also presented as a mere 
interpretation of law.166 So, for example, the principle of Member State liability, 
which goes ‘well beyond the terms of the relevant treaties and legislation’,167 is 
justified as ‘inherent in the system of the Treaty’.168 The need to preserve the 
image of the Court as a mere interpreter of the law is nicely illustrated by the 
following statement by Alberto Trabucchi, at the time Advocate General at the 
Court of Justice: 
 
The judicial nature of the activity prescribed by Article 177 [now 267 TFEU] 
implies in particular its clear distinction from the legislative function. The 
                                                     
165 On this constitutional reform see a special issue of (2009) Revue du droit public 565-684 or (in English) 
F. Fabbrini, ‘Kelsen in Paris: France’s Constitutional Reform and the Introduction of A Posteriori 
Constitutional Review of Legislation’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1297.  
166 See eg A. Trabucchi, ‘L’effet “erga omnes” des décisions préjudicielles rendues par la Cour de justice 
des Communautés européennes’ (1974) Revue trimestrielle du droit européen 56, 62; A.G. Toth, ‘The Authority 
of Judgments of the European Court of Justice: Binding Force and Legal Effects’ (1984) 4 Yearbook of 
European Law 1, 69; or more recently K. Lenaerts, et al, Procedural Law of the European Union (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed, 2006), 195.  
167 J.E. Pfander, ‘Member State Liability and Constitutional Challenge in the United States and Europe’ 
(2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 237, 248.  
168 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I-5357 at [35].  
  
Jan Komárek             Judic ia l  Lawmaking  and  Pr e c ed en t  i n  Sup r eme Cour t s 
 
 29
Court should not, therefore, be called to determine the best way how to 
regulate a particular case, but to define what the best interpretation that can 
apply to the act, that is an expression of heteronomy, is. If this fundamental 
distinction disappeared, the principal pillar of the Community constitution 
would be wrecked, because the constitution has been conceived as an 
organisation ruled by the law in the attribution of different powers and with 
the guarantee of the judicial control exercised precisely by the Court of 
Justice.169  
 
Does such understanding of judicial lawmaking have the same effects as in the US 
and France, allowing other actors to control or at least constrain the Court of 
Justice’s creative activity? I think that this question must be answered in the 
negative.  
First, unlike the US Constitution and the French Civil Code, the Treaties are 
an unfinished project, the purpose of which is contested.170 The Treaties are not a 
fixed point of reference, either in the form of a commitment of ‘We the People’ to 
‘form a more perfect Union’, as in the US Constitution, nor an enlightened 
codification of a ‘secular natural law ideal of one law applicable to all 
Frenchmen’,171 as in the French Civil Code. In short, the Treaties are not ‘the holy 
books of the law’.172 The uncertain nature of the European Union allows the 
Court to play the role of an institution responsible for giving the European project 
momentum, which is tacitly approved by the actors with decision-making power. 
The Court’s pronouncements are sometimes even taken as conclusive evidence for 
the constitutional character of the Union;173 but it is a generally accepted narrative 
of European integration that it was the Court that ‘constitutionalised’ it.174 As 
Damian Chalmers notes, ‘judicial supremacy has been a central seam in the EU 
legal order’, although he explains that it has applied in an extremely limited 
domain.175 
                                                     
169 Trabucchi, n 166 above, 61-62.  
170 See eg the contributions to C. Joerges, Y. Mény, and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), What Kind of Constitution for 
What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer (Jean Monnet Working Paper no. 7/00, 2000), at 
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/symp.html>.  
171 J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition. An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin 
America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2nd ed, 1985), 28.  
172 See R.C. van Caenegem, European Law in the Past and the Future: Unity and Diversity over Two Millennia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 54-72, who calls both ‘foundational documents’. I do 
not suggest that the EU Treaties should ever be based on the same foundational ideas as the US 
Constitution or the Civil Code. Here I only point out the difference.  
173 K. Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism’ (1990) 38 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 205, 210, quoting Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339 at [23].  
174 See in particular M. Poiares Maduro, ‘How Constitutional Can the European Union Be? The Tension 
Between Intergovernmentalism and Constitutionalism in the European Union’ in J.H.H. Weiler and C.L. 
Eisgruber (eds), Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective (Jean Monnet Working Paper no.  
5/04, 2004), 4-13 at <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040501-18.html> with references 
to other classics.  
175 ‘Judicial Authority and the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 448, 
448.  
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Secondly, there are no EU institutions to compete with the Court. In other 
words, in Europe there is no constitutional voice other than the Court’s. 
Whenever the Court issues a controversial judgment, it is a national government or 
other representative that complains; such complaints are always treated with 
suspicion and little serious attention.176 To my knowledge there has been no 
declaration from the Council, let alone the Commission, that it felt discontent with 
the Court of Justice’s ruling, comparable to those occasionally made by some 
governments.177 Similarly, when a Member State’s constitutional court challenges 
the Court of Justice’s interpretation, such challenge is based on the Member State 
court’s own frame of reference, not EU law. When the German Constitutional 
Court expresses its concern over the Union’s exercise of its competences or the 
Union’s respect for fundamental rights, it interprets the German Basic Law, not 
the Treaties. It is a competition between two distinct normative frames of 
reference, limited to one jurisdiction – that of the Member State in question. 
Thirdly, the Union’s legislature is not superior to the Court. As such it is 
unable to monitor and modify the Court’s activity, as is traditional in France. In 
fact, the contrary is true; the Council (a part of the Union’s legislative body) is 
sometimes presented as an institution which impedes the process of integration 
and must therefore be controlled by the Court. Mancini and Keeling describe 
Cassis de Dijon178 as ‘the judgment which best epitomizes “many interesting things 
you could do with the law”’.179 There ‘the Court imposed on the States a mutual 
recognition of their respective standards, which practically amounted to rendering 
the enactment of harmonizing directives unnecessary’.180 In this way, the Court 
overcame the requirement of unanimity in Council decision-making, which had 
hitherto prevented the adoption of much harmonising legislation.181 Moreover, 
since the Court derived the requirement of mutual recognition directly from the 
EC Treaty, it was impossible for the EU legislator to undo its work – the only way 
would be to adopt an express Treaty amendment – something as rare as 
amendments to the US Constitution in response to the Supreme Court’s rulings.182  
                                                     
176 See eg ‘Editorial’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 1571.  
177 One of the rare examples could be Council Resolution of 19 December 2002 on the amendment of 
the Directive concerning liability for defective products (2003/C 26/02), [2003] O.J. C26/1 at 2-3, where 
the Council states that ‘[the] legal situation [created by the Court’s interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the directive] gives rise to concern’, and ‘considers [...] there is a need to assess whether [the 
directive], should be modified’. But as we can see, the Council’s concern is expressed in most cautious 
terms and does not question authority of the Court as such.  
178 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1979] ECR 649.  
179 G.F. Mancini and D.T. Keeling ‘Language, Culture and Politics in the Life of the European Court of 
Justice’ (1995) 1 Columbia Journal of European Law 397, 405, quoting T. Koopmans, ‘The Role of Law in 
the Next Stage of European Integration’ (1986) 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 925, 928.  
180 ibid, 406.  
181 See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade’, in ibid (ed), The EU, 
the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 219.  
182 On the few examples of Treaty amendments see J.H.H. Weiler and U.R. Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of 
the Community Legal Order – Through the Looking Glass’ (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal 
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To summarise, the fiction of judicial lawmaking as interpretation does not 
mobilise other actors to limit the power of the Court as it does in the US and 
French systems, which employ the same fiction.  
 
WHO IS CONSTRAINED?  
 
Since I exhausted the question of the relevance of precedent beyond judicial 
process in the last section, I will focus here on the relevance of precedent in the 
Union judiciary, starting with courts other than the Court of Justice.  
As Monica Claes rightly observes, ‘it has become truism’ to think of Member 
States’ courts as true European courts.183 This is perhaps the single most 
important difference between the judicial systems of the EU and the US, where 
the central authority can rely on a complete system of federal judiciary, 
functionally distinct from the judicial systems of particular states. So although a 
significant part of US federal law is applied by states’ courts,184 the central (federal) 
authority can rely on its own system of courts and jurisdictional rules to secure 
sufficient control over the proper application of federal law throughout the United 
States.185 As a consequence of this, much of the federal law is interpreted by lower 
federal courts, and the opinions of the courts of appeal play an important role in 
the development of federal law.186 
In contrast, it is in the main the Court of Justice itself which creates the whole 
body of Union case law in all areas of Union activity. The General Court and the 
Civil Service Tribunal are the only equivalents to the US lower federal courts, but 
they have limited jurisdiction and have comparatively less impact on Member 
States’ legal systems. These courts seem to be constrained by the Court’s 
precedent in a way not unlike lower federal courts, a fact which follows from the 
existence of an appeal.187 There is potential for the General Court’s moderating 
role, however; Jégo-Quéré,188 where the General Court invited the Court to change 
                                                                                                                                       
411, 416 (fn 22), but as the current developments concerning the Lisbon Treaty confirm, in the Union of 
27 any Treaty amendment is extremely difficult to adopt. As regards the US, M.J. Gerhardt, The Power of 
Precedent (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9, notes that ‘the only alternative for politically 
retaliating against specific precedent [is] the appointment of new justices dedicated to overturning them’. 
(Gerhardt also lists the four examples of express constitutional amendment adopted in reaction to a 
specific ruling of the Court.)  
183 M. Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart, 
2006), 3.  
184 See generally D.H. Zeigler, ‘Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges 
Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law’ (1999) 40 William and Mary Law Review 1143.  
185 See eg Friedman, n 24 above.  
186 See the text to n 73 above.  
187 On the General Court’s approach to the Court’s precedent in general see A. Arnull, The European Union 
and its Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2006), 633-637. On the importance of 
appeal see the text to n 28 above.  
188 Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré v Commission [2002] ECR II-2365.  
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its forty-year-old case law concerning the standing of private parties to challenge 
EU legal acts,189 was rather exceptional.190  
The prominent role of the Court of Justice is highlighted by its reluctance to 
share jurisdiction to hear preliminary references with the General Court, as is 
possible now that the Treaty of Nice (2000) has introduced Article 225(3) TEC 
(now 256(3) TFEU). The ‘centralisation of the interpretative function, which 
promotes uniformity’ was described by Advocate General Colomer as the main 
justification for this reluctance,191 and seems to be shared by other members of the 
Court.192  
On the other hand, the Court has very limited means of enforcing the 
authority of its precedents in Member States’ courts although it clearly considers 
that they are binding on them. There is no appeal from Member States’ courts – 
only the preliminary ruling procedure, which lies entirely in their hands.193 It is true 
that, according to Köbler, if a Member State’s court of last instance gives a decision 
‘in manifest breach of the case-law of the Court in the matter’,194 private parties 
can claim damages from that state. However, such an action can potentially be 
decided by the same court,195 and the criterion of manifest breach rather 
discourages the bringing to court of a liability claim. Infringement actions initiated 
by the Commission do not seem to be a promising avenue either.196 So it can be 
that the authority of the Court of Justice’s precedent and the exclusivity of its 
lawmaking role are ‘moderated’ by Member States’ courts’ simple disregard of 
them.  
Moreover, if the Member States’ courts were duly to obey the Court’s 
prescriptions, the Court would collapse. Some authors believe that any court 
‘minded to diverge’ from the previous Court’s case law, ‘must first attempt to 
obtain a change […] by making a request for a preliminary ruling’.197 Although we 
will see that from one possible perspective the Court is given too few cases, 
                                                     
189 Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95. See eg J. Usher, ‘Direct and Individual Concern – 
An Effective Remedy or a Conventional Solution’ (2003) 28 European Law Review 575 with further 
references.  
190 Arnull, n 187 above, 635, gives another example: Case T-586/93 Kotzonis v ESC [1995] ECR II-665 at 
[92], where the General Court stated that it ‘considers that the case-law [of the Court of Justice] ought to 
be reconsidered’. The case was not appealed to the Court.  
191 Opinion of Advocate General Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster [2001] ECR I-9445 at [74]. 
192 See K. Lenaerts (a judge of the Court), ‘The Unity of European Law and the Overload of the ECJ – 
The System of Preliminary Rulings Revisited’ in I. Pernice, J. Kokott, and C. Saunders (eds), The Future of 
the European Judicial System in a Comparative Perspective (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), 232-236. For a critique 
of this centralising approach, stressing uniformity as the principal value, see J. Komárek, ‘“In the Court(s) 
We Trust?” On the Need for Hierarchy and Differentiation in the Preliminary Ruling Procedure’ (2007) 
32 European Law Review 467.  
193 J. Komárek, ‘Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System: Building Coherence in the 
Community Legal Order’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 9, 10.  
194 Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239 at [56].  
195 See Komárek, n 193 above, 29.  
196 See ibid, 23-26.  
197 Lenaerts, et al, n 166 above, 80 with further references.  
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compared with both the US Supreme Court and the Cour de cassation,198 it does 
not have the means rationally to manage even the (comparatively small!) number 
of cases it receives. There is no case selection,199 nor is it possible to deal with 
references for preliminary rulings in a mechanical way, as is possible in most cases 
before the Cour,200 which in addition has far more judges.201 Perhaps it is as good 
as it gets?  
 ‘The general position is and always has been that the Court of Justice is not 
bound by its previous decision but that in practice it does not often depart from 
them,’ Arnull says.202 This would be true if we saw precedential constraint in the 
binary way of binding/non-binding, which nevertheless does not fit reasoning 
from precedent. The US Supreme Court can overrule itself, yet it can do so only 
under certain circumstances, and it is common to talk about ‘horizontal stare 
decisis’. The Court of Justice seems to do the same – sometimes.  
There are few cases in which the Court of Justice has declared explicitly that it 
was changing its previous case law. The very first such case was HAG II, where 
the Court stated that it ‘believe[d] it necessary to reconsider the interpretation 
given in [a previous] judgment in the light of the case-law which has developed 
with regard to the relationship between industrial and commercial property and 
the general rules of the Treaty, particularly in the sphere of the free movement of 
goods’.203 In Keck the Court explained the need to depart from settled case law 
concerning the definition of an obstacle to trade caused by ‘the increasing 
tendency of traders to invoke Article [28] of the Treaty as a means of challenging 
any rules whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom even where such rules 
are not aimed at products from other Member States’.204  
On the other hand in Metock the Court merely stated that a conclusion arrived 
at in Akrich,205 (a previous decision on the point) ‘must be reconsidered’.206 In 
some cases the Court does not even acknowledge that it is departing from a 
                                                     
198 See the text to n 225-n 228 below.  
199 On the possibility of introducing it in the EU see L. Heffernan, ‘The Community Courts Post-Nice: A 
European Certiorari Revisited’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 907. 
200 Out of the thousands of cases decided by the Cour, only a small percentage are important or complex, 
which is reflected, among other things, by the Cour’s selective publication of decisions and classification 
of their importance. See the contribution of Alain Lacabarats, a judge and the Head of the Service of 
documentation and studies at the Cour (2007) Dalloz, Chronique, 889-891.  
201 This, however, creates its own problems (particularly in maintaining consistency and coherence), 
which are beginning to appear at the Court of Justice, too. See M. Bobek, ‘Learning to Talk: Preliminary 
Rulings, the Courts of the New Member States and the Court of Justice’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law 
Review 1611, 1636-1640.  
202 Arnull, n 187 above, 627.  
203 Case C-10/89 HAG [1990] ECR I-3711 at [10].  
204 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 at [14].  
205 Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607.  
206 Case C-127/08 Metock and Others, n.y.r. at [58].  
             4/2011 
 
 34
previous decision.207 It is therefore not very clear under what circumstances the 
Court of Justice decides to amend its previous interpretation.208  
Moreover, as some commentators note,  
 
references to [the Court’s] previous decisions became commonplace, but the 
analysis of them remained superficial and selective by the standards of 
English court. The reader of the Court’s judgments will be struck by the fact 
that previous decisions are often only cited by the Court where they support 
its argument. Authorities which point the other way are sometimes not 
mentioned at all, and sometimes even presented as if they support the line the 
Court has chosen to take.209  
 
Interestingly, while Keck is generally regarded by academics as a fundamental 
change in the free movement of goods rules,210 Ole Due, former president of the 
Court of Justice, feels the decision is ‘not as surprising as it may seem, […] nor 
[was] the change of the case-law as far reaching as it may seem at first look’.211 
Tesauro also did not regard it as ‘a revolutionary transition’.212 While statements of 
members of the Court can be explained by a desire to play down the importance 
of the change and thus protect the Court’s image as a neutral interpreter of Union 
law, the contrast with those of external observers of the Court may suggest that, in 
the absence of some shared (let alone articulated) precedent methodology, 
different actors can view developments in the Court’s case law quite differently. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
207 A well-known example is Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, 
where the Court changed the standards applicable for EU liability without admitting it. See Arnull, n 187 
above, 628-629, for a critique.  
208 There are also differences among advocates general: while Advocate General Maduro in his opinion in 
Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 Cipolla and Others [2006] ECR I-11421 at [26]-[30] expressly explains 
the value of precedent for the Court and the need to have additional reasons for reversing well-
established case law, Advocate General Léger, on the other hand, in his first opinion in Case C-280/00 
Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7747 at [73]-[98] only invites the Court to 
review its previous interpretation given in Case C-53/00 Ferring [2001] ECR I-9067.  
209 A. Arnull, et al, Wyatt & Dashwood’s European Union Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed, 2006), 
409. See also Arnull, n 207 above, 628 (which says the same, but in more diplomatic terms).  
210 N. Reich, ‘The “November Revolution” of the European Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi 
Revistited’ (1994) 31 Common Market Law Review 459.  
211 O. Due, ‘Dassonville Revisited or No Cause for Alarm?’ in A.I.L. Campbell and M. Voyatzi (eds), 
Legal Reasoning and Judicial Interpretation of European Law: Essays in Honour of Lord Mackenzie-Stuart (London: 
Trenton, 1998), 28.  
212 G. Tesauro, ‘The Community’s Internal Market in the Light of the Recent Case-law of the Court of 
Justice’ (1995) 15 Yearbook of European Law 1, 6.  
  
Jan Komárek             Judic ia l  Lawmaking  and  Pr e c ed en t  i n  Sup r eme Cour t s 
 
 35
THE NATURE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S PRECEDENT: SAYING TOO MUCH AND 
TOO LITTLE AT THE SAME TIME  
 
We have seen that a conception of a case before the US Supreme Court and the 
Cour de cassation is important for understanding the nature of precedential 
constraint.  
Firstly, the case limits the precedent court’s lawmaking activity. The scope of 
the Supreme Court’s precedent can be limited primarily by subsequent courts213 – 
with reference to some elements of the case which gave rise to the precedent 
decision subsequent courts can either narrow the holding of precedent or 
distinguish the precedent case from that before them. The scope of the Cour’s 
legislative precedents is limited by the Cour’s duty to reply to the legal grounds of 
appeal in cassation and nothing more.  
Secondly, the case brings elements of ‘real life’ into lawmaking through 
adjudication (in contrast to lawmaking by legislatures). While the real-life element 
is most clearly present in common law adjudication, in most of the constitutional 
cases the Supreme Court decides in a rather abstract fashion, disinterested in the 
individual circumstances of the applicant. However, ‘real life’ enters the 
adjudicative process before it reaches the peak of the judicial pyramid. It is noted 
more clearly in the context of the Cour de cassation’s adjudication as the prudence 
of law, implanted into the Cour’s jurisprudence through lower courts and also 
academic doctrine.  
How about the case before the Court of Justice and its relevance for 
precedent?  
The answer is complicated by the very different nature of procedures before 
the Court. These range from preliminary rulings which may concern the identity of 
two factual situations for the purposes of the application of the ne bis in idem 
principle,214 to opinions on the compatibility of an intended international treaty 
with EU law prior to its conclusion, where the Court decides in a purely abstract 
context.215 However the procedure tends to bring the Court closer to the Cour de 
cassation model – a court deciding purely legal questions. The purity is not 
absolute since the Court has far more flexibility when it comes to its willingness to 
engage with facts which underlie the legal questions before it. While this is 
generally acknowledged in the context of the preliminary ruling procedure,216 it is 
also true for other procedures, particularly in the light of an increasing tendency to 
deal with infringements consisting of the misapplication of EU law in concrete 
situations.217 The Court can very often choose in a rather arbitrary fashion the 
                                                     
213 ‘Subsequent courts’ are both lower courts and the Supreme Court itself, deciding later in a similar case.  
214 Case C-436/04 Van Esbroeck [2006] ECR I-2333 at [36].  
215 Art 218(11) TFEU. See eg Lenaerts, et al, n 166 above, 408-415.  
216 See eg S. Whittaker, ‘Precedent in English Law: A View from the Citadel’ (2006) 5/6 European Review of 
Private Law 705, 741-742.  
217 See J. Komárek, ‘Infringements in Application of Community Law: Some Problems and (Im)possible 
Solutions’ (2007) Review of European Administrative Law 87.  
             4/2011 
 
 36
level of generality on which it wants to engage with the case, including the level of 
attention it wants to pay to the facts.218  
However, we have seen that in many of the US Supreme Court’s decisions 
facts are relatively insignificant, and yet a case, defined differently, can play a role 
in precedential reasoning. Curran explains it in the following way:  
 
The common-law recognition of precedents as a binding source of law is 
blending with the civil-law custom of norm-formation for general prospective 
deductive application. The manner of applying the norms derived from 
European Court of Justice precedents is emerging in the civil-law style of 
privileging the deductive process from norm to application, and departing 
from the common-law insistence on limiting the applicability of norms 
derived from precedents to factually analogous future cases.219 
 
At the same time, the Court is not constrained in what it can say in its judgments, 
as the Cour de cassation is. Ironically, the Court says both too little and too much 
in its judgments and possesses a freedom incomparable to that of the US Supreme 
Court and the Cour de cassation. From this Arnull infers that ‘in principle 
everything that is said in a judgment of the Court of Justice expresses the Court’s 
opinion and is therefore capable of having the same persuasive force’.220 This 
appears incorrect, given the occasional practice of the Court’s Advocates General 
and the Court of First Instance of using the distinction between holding and 
dicta.221 But to my knowledge there have been no attempts to formulate a 
coherent approach to this distinction which aims at providing reasons why 
statements made by the Court can be ignored as mere ‘dicta’. And a concept of a 
case – here different from that before both the US Supreme Court and the French 
Cour de cassation – would be crucial in such an effort.  
The way in which courts communicate depends largely on the conception of 
authority they adopt. They can either seek to persuade through their precedents, or 
command by them. This distinction corresponds to two conceptions of the 
organisation of state authority and officialdom suggested by Mirjan Damaška – 
                                                     
218 See G. Davies, ‘Abstractness and Concreteness in the Preliminary Ruling Procedure: Implications for 
the Division of Powers and Effective Market Regulation’ in N.N. Shuibhne (ed), Regulating the Internal 
Market (Cheltenham and Northampton Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2006).  
219 Curran, n 155 above, 73.  
220 Arnull, n 187 above,  631 and also the opinion of Advocate General Roemer in Case 9/61 Netherlands 
v High Authority [1962] ECR 213, 242.  
221 Note that Arnull acknowledges that ‘[o]ccasionally, the Court seeks to distinguish a case on which a 
party has sought to rely’. ibid, 631. However, distinguishing a case and identifying its ratio are analytically 
two different things, although they aim at the same result – the avoidance of precedent. By distinguishing 
the subsequent court seeks to show that precedent is not relevant in the case before it, while by 
identifying some statement in the precedent judgment as ‘dicta’ it assumes that it is not binding (even if 
relevant).  
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coordinate and hierarchical222 – and is transposed into the organisation of the 
judicial process. The distinction between persuading and commanding is also 
reflected in two types of judicial discourse – authoritative or authoritarian – 
examined (in a rather esoteric way) by Joseph Vining.223  
The US Supreme Court’s precedent reflects coordinate authority and 
authoritative judicial discourse, while the Cour de cassation’s 
jurisprudence/legislative precedent corresponds to hierarchical authority and 
authoritarian discourse. The Court of Justice seem to lie somewhere between the 
two.  
If we were to examine its nature in Zénati’s footsteps, we could be inclined to 
say that the European Court of Justice is not a court – especially in the context of 
the preliminary ruling procedure (if being a court primarily means deciding on the 
rights and duties of parties before it). Again, the diversity of procedures before the 
Court undermines such characterisation, since it sometimes acts as a court, 
especially in the appeals it hears from the Court of First Instance. Although it can 
decide only legal questions, the fundamental difference from the Cour de cassation 
is that it can directly and conclusively determine the rights of the parties before it. 
However, even if the Court’s main task were to say what the law is (in the 
abstract), it cannot act with the same kind of authority as the Cour de cassation. 
Remember, the Cour is viewed as a ‘secular arm of the legislator’, which has been 
delegated the task of supervising lower courts and possibly developing the law if 
needed. The legislator is believed (whatever the reality) to ‘keep an eye’ on it and 
possibly correct its jurisprudence. No such link exists in the case of the Court of 
Justice. With some exaggeration it can be said to be a secular arm of European 
integration – but such kind of legitimacy appears deeply problematic, since – 
contrary to the ideal of representative government – European integration is a 
very much contested project.  
More importantly, the Court of Justice lacks any sanction by means of which 
it could impose its authority on Member States’ courts,224 and exercises very 
limited control in terms of the number of decisions of other courts it can review 
or guide through the preliminary ruling procedure. In 2009 the Court got 561 new 
cases and completed 588 cases, and 741 cases have remained pending.225 
Compared to this, in the October 2008 Term,226 the United States Supreme Court 
got 8.966 cases and disposed of 7.822, while 1.144 cases have remained on its 
docket.227 Finally, the Cour de cassation got in 2009 28.025 new cases and decided 
                                                     
222 See M.R. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority; A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986), 16-46.  
223 See J. Vining, The Authoritative and the Authoritarian (Chicago, Ill. and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1986).  
224 See the text to n 193 above.  
225 The Court of Justice’s Annual Report 2009, at <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7000/annual-
report>, 81.  
226 Lasting from 6 October 2008 to 5 October 2009.  
227 The Journal of the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 2008, at <http://www. 
supremecourt.gov/orders/journal/jnl08.pdf>, II.  
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28.594 cases, and 22.165 have remained to be disposed.228 The Court is therefore 
dependent on persuasion and cannot limit itself to giving brief unreasoned 
answers. On the other hand, as we saw in the previous subsection, there are few 
mechanisms which would limit its law-pronouncing activity. Again, the Court says 
both too little and too much in its judgments.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In conclusion I would like to suggest possible lines of further inquiry into judicial 
lawmaking and precedent in supreme courts, informed by the comparative 
findings offered by this article.  
Involvement and communication among constitutional actors beyond the 
supreme courts, when they give meaning to the ‘foundational documents’, is an 
underlying theme of this article. Involvement and communication allow each 
constitutional actor’s competence and legitimacy capital to be combined so that 
better and more legitimate decisions (in comparison to decisions taken by a single 
actor) can be taken. I hope to have shown that while the US and French systems 
seek to achieve this through their particular understanding of judicial lawmaking 
and precedent, in the EU this is far more problematic. More work is needed to 
examine how involvement and communication through judicial precedent work in 
the real context of constitutional adjudication, where the traditional conceptions 
do not hold. For example, it is difficult to find a satisfactory definition of a case in 
the context of constitutional adjudication. Is it an abstract issue only? Or do ‘real-
life’ facts play any role in the definition of the case?  
A case – either in the form of a real-life situation or as a legal issue presented 
for the court’s decision – constitutes a framework through which the precedent 
decision can be connected to subsequent cases. There must be some criteria 
determining why the precedent case is ‘relevantly similar’ to a subsequent one in 
which a norm implicated in the precedent is intended to be applied. Schauer calls 
these criteria ‘rules of relevance’.229 What are the rules of relevance in 
constitutional adjudication?  
I hope this article has provided some material for further thought about these 
questions and, more importantly, shown their practical importance for our 
understanding of supreme courts’ role as adjudicators and at the same time 
lawmakers. But the real work is only beginning.  
                                                     
228 Cour de cassation, Rapport annuel 2009, at <http://www.courdecassationfr/publications_cour_26/ 
rapport_annuel_36/>, 499 (‘les affaires enregistrées’), 501 (‘les affaires jugées’ and ‘le stock géneral’).  
229 See F. Schauer, ‘Precedent’ (1987) 39 Stanford Law Review 571, 576-579. In the context of reasoning by 
analogy see Schauer, n 3 above, 92-96. B. Leiter, ‘Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication’ (1996) 106 
Yale Law Journal 253, however suggests that it is not possible to theorise such relevance judgments.  
